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Abstract
The relatively sudden boom in shale gas production in the United States using hydraulic fracturing has provoked increasingly intense political conflict. The debate over fracking and shale gas
production has become polarized very quickly, in part because of the size of the economic and
environmental stakes. This polarized debate fits a familiar template in American environmental
law, pitting “cool analysis” against “moral outrage.” Opponents of fracking have generally framed
their arguments in moral or ethical terms, while systematic research is beginning to build a more
careful and nuanced understanding of the risks associated with shale gas production (though the
record is far from complete). All of which makes the question of how to produce shale gas “responsibly” – corporate social responsibility being the focus of this symposium – very difficult to
answer. This essay argues that: (i) because shale gas production entails difficult to measure and
unevenly distributed costs and benefits, there is no clear responsible (read: ethically preferable) set
of limitations that we ought to impose on shale gas production; and (ii) moral outrage is obscuring
(or influencing perceptions of) empirical facts in the shale gas policy debate. More specifically,
well-established behavioral heuristics – particularly, confirmation biases and the cultural cognition of risk – are impeding the development of a common understanding of the empirical facts
necessary to guide policymaking. Recognizing this, policymakers must resist political pressures
and work that much harder to ground their decisions in empirically-demonstrated facts – namely,
those produced by sources that are less susceptible to these heuristics and biases. Thus, information generated by rigorous, empirical analyses performed by academic or government sources
ought to be credited over anecdotes or studies associated with industry or NGOs that have staked
out a clear pro or con position in the fracking debate. Indeed, responsible fracking decisions ought
to consider all of the consequences of permitting, regulating or banning shale gas production,
including the relative risks of shale gas production compared with the relevant energy alternatives.
KEYWORDS: hydraulic fracturing, fracking, shale gas production

RESPONSIBLE SHALE GAS PRODUCTION: MORAL
OUTRAGE VS. COOL ANALYSIS
David B. Spence*
As long as the connection subsists between [man’s] reason
and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a
reciprocal influence on each other.
— James Madison1
INTRODUCTION
American energy policy has been transformed in recent years by
the increased production of natural gas from formerly inaccessible
shale formations using hydraulic fracturing2 (also known as
fracking). The United States has become the world leader in natural
gas production3 after only recently facing the prospect of having to
rely on natural gas imports.4 However, shale gas production has

* Professor of Law, Politics and Regulation, McCombs School of Business and
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin. Professor Spence
would like to thank the UCLA students in Professor Ann Carlson’s seminar on
energy and climate, and the participants at Fordham Environmental Law Review’s
February 22, 2013 symposium on corporate social responsibility for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
2. For description of this production technique, see infra Part I.
3. The U.S. Surpassed Russia as World’s Leading Producer of Dry Natural
Gas in 2009 and 2010, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 13, 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5370.
4. See Howard Rogers, Shale Gas—The Unfolding Story, 27 OXFORD REV. OF
ECON. POL’Y 117, 118 (2011):
As we entered the 2000s the prevailing view of gas as a cheap and
plentiful energy source changed to one of concern over the ability of
gas supplies to keep pace with future rising demand, particularly in the
power generation sector. In North America, in 2001 domestic
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generated opposition—indeed, an opposition movement—focused on
the environmental externalities5 posed by fracking. Those
externalities include truck traffic, noise, social and economic
disruption, and increased risks (the magnitude of which is disputed)
of groundwater contamination, seismic activity, and air pollution. At
the same time, shale gas production brings significant economic
benefits in the form of lower energy prices,6 jobs in shale gas
production areas,7 and increased investment in industries for which
production began a pronounced decline and large-scale liquefied
natural gas (LNG) imports appeared inevitable by 2010.
5. The term “externality” refers to costs of production that are not borne by the
firm, but rather are shifted to society. Externalities can be either negative or
positive. For a discussion of the economics of negative externalities, see TOM
TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, 52–54 (3d
ed. 1992). For a discussion of the externalities of shale gas production, see infra
Part I.B.
6. Gas prices have fallen from more than $10 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) a
decade ago to less than $4/Mcf today. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 36 (2012),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo12/pdf/0383(2012).pdf
(describing
production increase); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Selected Average Natural Gas
Prices, 2007-2012, NATURAL GAS MONTHLY, Feb. 2013, http://www.eia.gov/
naturalgas/monthly/archive/2013/2013_02/pdf/table_03.pdf
(describing
price
declines). One way to predict future natural gas prices is to look at so-called
“forward curves” produced by the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”).
These curves are based upon prices of futures contracts—contracts for the sale of
natural gas at various points in the future. The current NYMEX forward curve for
natural gas projects that prices will remain at or below five dollars per million Btu
(“MMBtu”) over the next five years. See Gas Futures Trading: Forward Price
Curve, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n (last updated Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-gas/trading/ngas-tr-fwd-pr.pdf.
7. See Economics of the Bakken Oil Boom: What the Rest of the Nation is
Missing, INST. FOR ENERGY RES., (Jan. 8, 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.
org/2013/01/08/economics-of-the-bakken-oil-boom-what-the-rest-of-the-nation-ismissing (detailing low unemployment and other economic benefits in the Bakken
Shale region); Robert T. Garrett, South Texas Drilling Boom Shakes Loose Dollars
for State Budget Writers, THE DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2013, 10:48 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/texas-legislature/headlines/20130107south-texas-drilling-boom-shakes-loose-dollars-for-state-budgetwriters.ece?action=reregister (detailing the budgetary and other economic benefits
of the shale gas boom in the Eagle Ford Shale region); Mark Lisheron, Booming
Revenues Have Officials in Texas Pondering Pay Raises, Boosts to Programs,
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natural gas is an important input.8 It also produces environmental
benefits (the magnitude of which are also disputed) by facilitating the
substitution of natural gas for coal in the American energy mix.9
All of which has made shale gas production the focus of
increasingly intense political conflict. It is the industry’s job to
develop energy resources responsibly and the government’s job to
regulate shale gas production. However, the debate over fracking and
shale gas production has become polarized very quickly, in part
because of the size of the economic and environmental stakes. In
recent years, some nations (France,10 South Africa11), several U.S.
states,12 and many local communities13 have imposed permanent or
TEXAS WATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 2013, 10:53 AM), http://www.texaswatchdog.org/2013/
01/booming-revenues-have-officials-in-texas-pondering-pay/1357749744.column
(chronicling increases in state tax revenues attributable to shale gas development).
8. See, e.g., Kevin Bullis, Shale Gas Will Fuel a U.S. Manufacturing Boom,
MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/509291/
shale-gas-will-fuel-a-us-manufacturing-boom (ascribing increased investment in
manufacturing in the United States to low natural gas prices); Shale Gas Fuels U.S.
Manufacturing Renaissance, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 10, 2013, 11:18 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130110005889/en/Shale-Gas-FuelsU.S.-Manufacturing-Renaissance (describing ExxonMobil’s projections of
increased U.S. investment in chemicals manufacturing due to low gas prices).
9. For a fuller discussion of these benefits, see infra Part III.
10. Tara Patel, France to Keep Fracking Ban to Protect Environment, Sarkozy
Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-10-04/france-to-press-ahead-with-shale-research-after-fracking-ban.html
(“France will maintain a ban on fracking until there is proof that shale gas
exploration won’t harm the environment or ‘massacre’ the landscape, President
Nicolas Sarkozy said.”).
11. Steve Hargreaves, The Fracking Public Relations Mess, CNN MONEY (June
21, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/21/news/economy/fracking_
public_relations/index.htm (“When Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley issued an
executive order banning fracking earlier this month, the state joined the ranks of
New York, Quebec, Germany, France and South Africa to halt the controversial
technique for extracting natural gas from shale rock.”).
12. The state of Vermont has banned fracking. Vermont Fracking Ban: Green
Mountain State Is First In U.S. To Restrict Gas Drilling Technique, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 16, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/17/
vermont-fracking-ban-first_n_1522098.html (describing the Vermont ban as
largely symbolic, since Vermont has few shale gas resources). New York has
imposed a moratorium on certain kinds of hydraulic fracturing pending further
study of the problem. The New York ban was created by executive order of the
governor, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41 (Dec. 13, 2010), requiring further
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temporary bans on fracking. These bans and moratoria reflect the
intensity with which some people have opposed fracking operations
on environmental, health and safety grounds.14 In many ways, this
public policy debate over hydraulic fracturing fits a familiar template
in American environmental law, the duality of which Christopher
Schroeder once described as “cool analysis” versus “moral
outrage.”15 Opponents of fracking have generally framed their

environmental of high-volume fracking in the Marcellus shale, following his veto
of state legislation imposing a much broader ban. See S. 8129-B, 2010 Leg., 233d
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010). Bills have been introduced into the New Jersey and
Maryland legislatures to impose moratoria on fracking there, though the governors
of both states have already imposed moratoria pending further study. See Assemb.
3644, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2013), available at http://legiscan.com/NJ/text/A3644/id/
678194 (text of the proposed New Jersey legislation); Del. Shane Robinson and
Sen. Karen Montgomery Introduce Statewide Ban on Fracking, FOOD & WATER
WATCH (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/pressreleases/delshane-robinson-and-sen-karen-montgomery-introduce-statewide-ban-on-fracking
(describing the new bills introduced into the Maryland legislature); Tom Johnson,
Fracking Ban Doesn’t Go Far Enough for Environmentalists, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Feb.
4, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/02/03/fracking-ban-doesn-t-go-farenough-for-environmentalists (describing the New Jersey legislation and the
governor’s moratorium); Timothy B. Wheeler, O’Malley Panel Urges Fracking
Safeguards, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 7, 2013), available at http://articles.
baltimoresun.com/2013-01-07/features/bs-gr-fracking-legislation-20130107_1_
severance-tax-sand-and-chemicals-shale-gas-extraction (describing the situation in
Maryland).
13. Hargreaves, supra note 11.
14. See John Kemp, Making Fracking Politically Acceptable, REUTERS (Feb. 6,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/column-fracking-politics-idUSL
5E8D62Q920120206; Mireya Navarro, Judge’s Ruling Complicates Hydrofracking
Issue in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
02/23/nyregion/judges-ruling-complicates-hydrofracking-issue-in-new-york.html;
Jim Polsen, New Yorkers Split on Marcellus Shale Gas Drilling, Survey Finds,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201109-21/new-yorkers-split-on-marcellus-shale-gas-drilling-survey-finds.html.
15. Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the
Development of Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
251 (1993). Economist Anthony Downs earlier described a related pattern in
environmental law, which he called “the issue attention cycle.” See Anthony
Downs, Up and Down with Ecology—The “Issue Attention Cycle”, 28 PUB. INT. 38
(1972). For a more general discussion of the role of morality in the history of
environmental law, see David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the
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arguments in moral or ethical terms, calling shale gas production a
“nightmare”16 that will harm people and the environment. The
industry’s proponents point to the paucity of hard data supporting
opponents’ claims, dispute the anecdotal evidence opponents cite,
and respond with their own exaggerated claims. Meanwhile,
systematic research is beginning to build our understanding of the
risks associated with shale gas production, though the record is far
from complete.
This makes the question of how to produce shale gas
“responsibly”—as corporate social responsibility was the focus of
this symposium—very difficult to answer. This essay will explore the
role of moral outrage and cool analysis in the debate over how to
produce shale gas responsibly. Its basic thesis is that: (i) we ought not
to assess the risks of shale gas production in a vacuum, but rather
ought to base regulatory decisions on the relative risks of shale gas
production; and (ii) moral outrage is obscuring (or influencing
perceptions of) empirical facts in the shale gas policy debate. Part I
of this essay explains the foundations of the fracking debate,
including the process of producing natural gas from shale formations
using hydraulic fracturing. This section briefly summarizes what we
know (and do not know) about its impacts. Part II will explore the
concept of “responsible development,” and the behavioral questions
surrounding any normative assessment of this form of energy
production. Part II.A will argue that any normative analysis of
fracking (or fracking regulation) must be based upon the
identification and measurement of the impacts of shale gas
production, a matter over which combatants in the fracking debate
cannot agree. Part II.B examines the behavioral dimensions of the
fracking debate, and argues that well-established behavioral
heuristics—particularly, confirmation biases and the cultural
cognition of risk—can impede the development of a common
understanding of the empirical facts necessary to guide
policymaking. The concluding section, Part III, argues for policies
based upon empirically-demonstrated facts—namely, those produced
Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
145, 168–71 (1995).
16. The term “nightmare” is routinely used by anti-fracking activists and others
to describe the effects of fracking. A Google search of the term “fracking
nightmare” on February 7, 2013 produced 744,000 results.
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by sources that are less susceptible to the heuristics and biases
outlined in Part II. Thus, information generated by rigorous,
empirical analyses performed by academic or government sources
ought to be credited over anecdotes or studies associated with
industry or NGOs that have staked out a clear pro or con position in
the fracking debate.
I. MORAL OUTRAGE, COOL ANALYSIS, AND SHALE GAS
PRODUCTION
It will come as no surprise to those familiar with the history of
American environmental policy that the shale gas policy debate is
infused with a healthy dose of moral outrage, while cool analysis of
the issues is mostly relegated to government and academic circles.
Appeals to morality and ethics can mobilize public attention to
important issues17 and have featured prominently in American
environmental policy history.18 Indeed, the major environmental
legislation of the 1970s might not have been possible but for the
ability of environmental groups and other political entrepreneurs to
mobilize the American public using appeals based upon the risk of
harm caused by industrial activity.19 Like their predecessor activists
in the environmental movement, opponents of shale gas production
often frame their objections in normative ethical terms, focusing on
the harm shale gas production might do, on producers’ alleged
indifference to that harm,20 and on locals’ right to be free from that
17. See Downs, supra note 15 (describing how groundswells of public attention
can galvanize political support for environmental initiatives).
18. Id.
19. For further development of this idea, see James Gray Pope, Republican
Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional
Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1990); see also Daniel A. Farber, Politics and
Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60 (1992); David B.
Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
423–26 (2002).
20. See, e.g., Alison Rose Levy, 4 Horrifying Dangers of Fracking, ALTERNET
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/fracking/4-horrifying-dangers-fracking;
Sara Jerving, Fracking Exposed: Shocking New Report Links Drilling With Breast
Cancer and Women’s Violence, POLICYMIC (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.policymic.
com/articles/6465/fracking-exposed-shocking-new-report-links-drilling-withbreast-cancer-and-women-s-violence. See also Sean Lennon, Destroying Precious
Land for Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/
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harm.21 Proponents of fracking have focused mostly on refuting
charges that fracking leads to environmental harm, and on touting the
economic benefits of shale gas production.22 Because shale gas
production is a young industry, we are still learning about its effects,
effects which the combatants in the fracking debate dispute.
Therefore, it is important at the outset to separate the disputed from
the undisputed facts about fracking.
A. The Undisputed Effects of Fracking
Conventional natural gas production involves the drilling of wells
into permeable or semi-permeable formations in which natural gas
(methane) is found under pressure, providing a conduit through
which that gas flows to the surface.23 Shale gas, by contrast, is
trapped in non-permeable rock found at great depths (usually 4000–
10,000 feet) below the Earth’s surface.24 In the last decade or so, oil
opinion/sean-lennon-destroying-precious-land-for-gas.html?_r=4&hp& (charging
gas companies with lack of concern over the effects of fracking, and with the
intention to “fracture our little town.”).
21. See, e.g., Jordo Bivona, Chesapeake’s Fracking Stirs Fears, THE MOTLEY
FOOL (Nov. 29, 2012), http://beta.fool.com/jordobivona/2012/11/29/chesapeakesfracking-stirs-fears/17321 (evoking comparisons between the Fukushima nuclear
accident and fears of fracking in Pennsylvania); Sabrina Artel, How Fracking Is a
Danger to Your Health, ALTERNET (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/
fracking/how-fracking-danger-your-health.
22. The best-known pro-fracking industry group is Energy In Depth, which
makes the scientific case for fracking. See ENERGY IN DEPTH,
http://energyindepth.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2013); see also Kevin Begos,
Experts: Some Fracking Critics Use Bad Science, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 22,
2012, 6:44 PM), available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/experts-some-frackingcritics-use-bad-science (disputing allegations of critics); The Facts About
Hydraulic Fracturing and Seismic Activity, http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/
Policy/Hydraulic_Fracturing/Facts-HF-and-Seismic-Activity.pdf (last visited Nov.
14, 2013) (also challenging critics); Raymond G. Mullady Jr., Fracking Chemicals
Not Harmful, POWER ENGINEERING (May 9, 2011), http://www.power-eng.com/
articles/2011/05/fracking-chemicals-not-harmful.html.
23. Conventional natural gas may be found dissolved in the oil, or as a cap on
top of underground oil formations (so-called “associated gas,” because it was
associated with oil production); alternatively, it may be found between rock
formations in the absence of oil (“unassociated gas”).
24. Some shale gas formations are even deeper. For a good description of the
major shale gas formations in the United States, including data on their respective
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and gas production and service companies have coupled an old
technique, hydraulic fracturing, with a relatively new one, horizontal
drilling, to produce natural gas from shale formations in an
economical way. Hydraulic fracturing involves the injection of fluids
deep into the ground at high pressure to fracture rock, thereby
creating openings that allow gas to flow into production wells.25 This
form of fracking was first used widely in the Barnett Shale (Texas)
and the Haynesville Shale (Louisiana), but quickly spread to other
areas, including North Dakota’s Bakken Shale, Arkansas’
Fayetteville Shale, the Eagle Ford Shale in south Texas, and the
Marcellus Shale in the northeastern United States (see Figure 1).
Americans currently consume about 25 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas
per year.26 It is estimated that American shale deposits hold several
hundreds of trillions of cubic feet of gas,27 and that total U.S.
reserves represent more than 100 years of U.S. consumption at
current rates.28 The recent commercial availability of all of this gas
has, for the first time, separated American natural gas prices from oil
prices, and driven gas prices down below $4.00 per million Btu
(MmBtu), as compared with more than $10/MmBtu only a few years

depths, see GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, MODERN SHALE GAS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 17, http://www.netl.doe.gov/
technologies/oil-gas/publications/epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf.
25. Id. at ES–4.
26. Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm (last updated Oct. 31,
2013).
27. Estimates of technically recoverable amounts of gas are frequently revised
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the U.S. Geological
Survey, two of the more widely followed sources of data on this topic. The EIA’s
estimates have fluctuated between around 400 Tcf and 800 Tcf recently. See
Technically Recoverable Shale Gas Resources Jump 134 Percent, INST. FOR
ENERGY RES. (May 16, 2011), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/05/
16/technically-recoverable-shale-gas-resources-jump-134-percent.
28. The EIA’s most recent estimate of technically recoverable reserves is
approximately 2200 Tcf. Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Natural Gas
Does the United States Have and How Long Will It Last?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=58&t=8 (last updated Aug. 29,
2012). This is a considerable increase from previous estimates, which fluctuated
between approximately 350 and 850 Tcf. INST. FOR ENERGY RES., supra note 27.
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ago.29 This has created boomtowns,30 and the prospect of inexpensive
natural gas for the foreseeable future has triggered plans for new
industrial development in industries that use natural gas as an input.31
Figure 1: American Shale Gas Plays (Formations), May 2011
Figure Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration32

In addition to its economic benefits, the shale gas boom has
produced some environmental benefits as well, most of which are
associated with the displacement of coal by suddenly inexpensive
natural gas in the electric generation sector. Natural gas combustion
29. Natural Gas Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_dcu_nus_m.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2013).
30. See e.g., North Dakota Boomtown Suffers Growing Pains Trying to Keep
Up with Demand (PBS NewsHour television broadcast Aug. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec12/boomtown_08-07.html;
Deon Daugherty, A Look Inside an Eagle Ford Boomtown—and Its Traffic,
HOUSTON BIZBLOG (Oct. 28, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
houston/blog/2011/10/a-look-inside-an-eagle-ford-boomtown—.html?page=all.
31. See AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, SHALE GAS AND NEW PETROCHEMICALS
INVESTMENT: BENEFITS FOR THE ECONOMY, JOBS, AND US MANUFACTURING
(2011),
http://chemistrytoenergy.com/sites/chemistrytoenergy.com/files/ACCShale-Report.pdf
32. This figure was adapted from a full-color map of North American shale gas
plays produced by the EIA, Lower 48 States Shale Plays, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/rpd/shale_gas.pdf (last updated May 9, 2011).
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produces far less pollution than oil or coal combustion.33 Recent
additions to U.S. electric generating capacity from gas-fired plants
have outpaced additions of new coal-fired capacity.34 In April 2012,
coal-fired power’s share of American electricity generation fell to
about the same level as natural gas for the first time ever,35 and
energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in the United States during
the first quarter of 2012 were at their lowest levels since 1992, a fact
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) attributed to a
combination of demand factors and the displacement of coal-fired
power by natural gas-fired power.36 The substitution of gas-fired for
coal-fired electric generation should yield significant non-climate
related benefits as well, since natural gas combustion produces far
fewer of the more deadly toxic pollutants (such as sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and mercury) emitted by coal
combustion.
At the same time, shale gas production produces significant
negative environmental externalities as well. The process of fracking
a well is organized and executed at the surface, on a concrete pad
33. See Natural Gas, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-andyou/affect/natural-gas.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2013) (comparing the emissions
of coal combustion with those of natural gas combustion).
34. In most wholesale electricity markets electric generating plants are
“dispatched”—that is, authorized to supply power to customers over the electric
grid—on a marginal cost basis, with the least expensive plants dispatched first,
thereby commanding more customers. In other words, subject to certain
requirements aimed at maintaining the reliability and security of the electric
system, at any given time of day the available generating facilities operating at the
lowest marginal cost are dispatched first to meet additional demand. Prospective
investors know this, and seek to invest in power plants that are likely to hold a
favorable place in the dispatch order.
35. Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/query/index.cfm?periodType=MONTHLY&start
Year=1994&endYear=2014&formulas=x146x1g (last updated Oct. 8, 2013); see
also Guy Chazan, Shale Gas Boom Helps Slash US Emissions, FIN. TIMES (May
23, 2012, 11:57 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3aa19200-a4eb-11e1-b42100144feabdc0.html#axzz2gsxPKDRz (quoting IEA chief economist Fatih Birol
supporting this conclusion).
36. U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions in Early 2012 Lowest since 1992, U.S
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=7350. Some opponents of shale gas production dispute the climate
effects of substituting shale gas for coal in electric generation. See infra Part I.B.3.
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roughly the size of a football field. Fracking uses very large volumes
of water—millions of gallons per fracking operation—which may
strain water supplies in arid parts of the country.37 The use of so
much water requires hundreds or thousands of tanker truck trips to
the well pad site, and the construction of lagoons or other storage
facilities for fluids. So-called fracking fluids will be handled (and
may be mixed) at the well pad site, posing the risk of spills. While
fracking fluid mixtures are usually more than ninety-five percent
water and sand,38 the remainder of the mixture consists of various
chemicals designed to enhance the efficiency of the fracturing
process for the particular rock formation being fractured.39 Some
fracking fluid constituents are toxic,40 and some fracking mixtures
contain known carcinogens.41 The oil and gas industry is developing
fracking fluid mixtures that contain non-toxic or less toxic
constituents, but it does not appear that these alternatives are yet in
wide use.42
37. See, e.g., Kate Galbraith, Texas Study Finds Increased Use of Water for
Fracking, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/01/15/
texas-study-traces-fracking-and-water-use (detailing the strains on water supplies
in Texas).
38. Sand is the “proppant” that props open spaces in the rock in a durable way
after the water pressure is reduced and the water flows away from the fractures.
39. The components of fracturing fluids have become generally known over the
last few years, in part because of efforts by regulatory agencies to compel
disclosure, and in part because of voluntary disclosure efforts by natural gas
producers and their contractors. For a primer on fracturing fluid composition, see
GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, supra note 24.
40. For a thorough discussion of the toxicity of constituents of fracturing fluids,
see Jay Kimball, Congress Releases Report on Toxic Chemicals Used in Fracking,
8020 VISION (Apr. 17, 2011), http://8020vision.com/2011/04/17/congress-releasesreport-on-toxic-chemicals-used-in-fracking; Chemicals & Public Disclosure,
FRACFOCUS, www.fracfocus.org/chemical-use/chemicals-public-disclosure (last
visited Nov. 5, 2013).
41. Id. Industry groups argue that these same constituents are commonly found
in many other household products. See, e.g., Ken Cohen, “Fracking” Fluid
Disclosure: Why It’s Important, EXXONMOBIL PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://www.exxonmobilperspectives.com/2011/08/25/fracking-fluid-disclosurewhy-its-important (detailing some of the common household products containing
the same chemicals found in fracturing fluid mixtures).
42. See New EPA-Approved Fracking Fluid 100% Green: SteriFrac Makes
Fracking Process Safe for Oil & Gas Industry, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 10, 2012, 11:00
AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120110005568/en/EPA-
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The well pad houses industrial equipment, including compressors
and generators which, along with the truck traffic, will create the
kind of noise, air emissions, and other activity associated with
industrial land uses. The injection of fracking fluids into the ground
to fracture rock will produce wastewater: “flowback water” (fracking
fluids that return to the surface) and produced water (from deepwater
aquifers) that may contain salts and naturally occurring toxic
elements, such as arsenic, as well as radioactivity.43 Current
wastewater disposal options include direct disposal into surface
waters through a point source, injection of the wastewater into an
underground injection well,44 disposal through a wastewater
treatment facility,45 and recycling the water (that is, reusing it in
other fracking operations). However, in some parts of the country,
underground injection is neither easy nor available; and depending
upon the characteristics of the produced water, it may be difficult or
Aproved-Fracking-Fluid-100-Green; Emran Hussain, Baker Hughes Launches
Green Fracking Fluid Systems, ARABIAN OIL AND GAS (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.arabianoilandgas.com/article-8157-baker-hughes-launches-greenfracking-fluid-systems/1/#.UniF_flwoyg. Some natural gas producers have begun
to advocate “propane fracking,” a technique for fracturing rock which uses liquid
propane instead of conventional fracking fluids, claiming “100% recovery” of
fracking fluids in the process. See, e.g., Safer Energy Solutions, GASFRAC ENERGY
SERVICES, http://www.gasfrac.com/safer-energy-solutions.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2013).
43. See William J. Kemble, Kingston Won’t Accept Fracturing Fluids at
Sewage Treatment Plant, City Engineer Says, DAILY FREEMAN NEWS (Dec. 19,
2011, 11:05 PM), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/articles/2011/12/19/news/
doc4eee73521641a869886272.txt (citing problems associated with the presence of
salts and radioactive materials in wastewater from fracturing operations).
Wastewater can become radioactive because of radioactive elements that enter the
water deep in the ground. For a good description of these so-called “naturallyoccurring radioactive materials” (NORM), see Oil and Gas Production Wastes,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/tenorm/oilandgas.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2013).
44. This would require an underground injection well permit under the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(h) (2012). The original injection of fluids for
fracking purposes does not require such a permit by virtue of an exemption
established in the 2005 Energy Policy Act. § 300(h)(d)(1)(B)(ii).
45. This kind of discharge would be subject to Clean Water Act pretreatment
standards, which prohibit discharges that “interfere” with the operation of the plant
or cause pollutants to “pass through” to surface waters. See 40 C.F.R. §
403.5(a)(1).
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impossible to obtain the required Clean Water Act permission46 to
discharge the wastewater directly into surface waters or to
pretreatment facilities. Furthermore, underground injection of
wastewater from fracking operations in the wrong location can
trigger seismic events.47 Recent earthquakes linked in news reports to
fracturing operations in Ohio,48 Oklahoma,49 and Arkansas50 all
appear to be the product of disposal of wastewater from gas
production operations. Some experts believe, however, that “microseismicity” can result directly from fracking operations under certain
conditions,51 though fracturing-induced tremors ought to be far
46. This kind of discharge would be subject to the requirement to obtain and
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under section
402 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
47. Underground injection of wastewater from gas production operations may
have triggered earthquakes in Ohio and Texas recently. See Pete Spotts, How
Fracking Might Have Led to an Ohio Earthquake, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2012/0102/How-frackingmight-have-led-to-an-Ohio-earthquake; David J. Hayes, Is the Recent Increase in
Felt Earthquakes in the Central US Natural or Manmade?, U.S. DEP’T OF
INTERIOR (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Is-the-RecentIncrease-in-Felt-Earthquakes-in-the-Central-US-Natural-or-Manmade.cfm. Some
fear that fracking operations (rather than wastewater disposal operations) are to
blame. See Henry Fountain, Add Quakes to Rumblings Over Gas Rush, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/science/some-blamehydraulic-fracturing-for-earthquake-epidemic.html.
48. Id. (noting that quakes reported in Ohio appear to be associated with a deep
wastewater disposal well located near a fault line).
49. John Daly, U.S. Government Confirms Link between Earthquakes and
Fracking, OILPRICE (Nov. 8, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://oilprice.com/Energy/NaturalGas/U.S.-Government-Confirms-Link-Between-Earthquakes-and-HydraulicFracturing.html (noting that the Oklahoma quakes were near 181 underground
injection wells for disposal of wastewater).
50. Alec Liu & Jeremy A. Kaplan, Earthquakes in Arkansas May Be ManMade, Experts Warn, FOX NEWS (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/
2011/03/01/fracking-earthquakes-arkansas-man-experts-warn (ascribing Arkansas
quakes to underground injection wells).
51. Austin Holland, Examination of Possibly Induced Seismicity from Fracking
in the Eola Field, Garvin County, Oklahoma, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURV. 1 (2011),
http://www.ogs.ou.edu/pubsscanned/openfile/OF1_2011.pdf (hypothesizing that
depending upon subsurface conditions, water used in the fracturing process could
cause small tremors). See also Garry White, Cuadrilla Admits Drilling Caused
Blackpool Earthquakes, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2011, 12:36 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/8864669/Cuadrilla-
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smaller in magnitude than those associated with underground
injection for disposal, all else equal.52
Some shale gas production regions have experienced boomtown
effects. Truck traffic can destroy local roads built for smaller vehicles
and smaller traffic volumes, and the boom in people and traffic can
burden other local infrastructure.53 The sudden creation of job
opportunities in a production region can change local economies. For
example, truck drivers in the Eagle Ford Shale in South Texas make
as much as $80,000 per year,54 and high school graduates are opting
for high-paying energy industry jobs over college in some energy
boomtowns. The presence of these relatively highly paid workers in
significant numbers can cause inflation, rendering goods and services
unaffordable (or less affordable) to locals, some of who do not
benefit financially from the production boom.55 It is the domestic
equivalent of the famous “oil curse.”56 In addition, the influx of
(mostly male) workers to boomtowns can also cause social problems,
bringing prostitution and increased alcohol consumption to formerly

admits-drilling-caused-Blackpool-earthquakes.html (experts concluded that it is
“highly probable” that small tremors were caused by fracturing operations).
52. Fountain, supra note 47 (“Scientists say the likelihood of that link is
extremely remote, that thousands of fracking and disposal wells operate nationwide
without causing earthquakes, and that the relatively shallow depths of these wells
mean that any earthquakes that are triggered would be minor.”); GROUND WATER
PROTECTION COUNCIL, supra note 24, at ES–19 (“there is essentially no increased
risk to the public, infrastructure, or natural resources from induced seismicity”
related to fracking, in part because the micro-tremors created by fracturing “are too
small to be felt, or to cause damage at the ground surface or to nearby wells.”).
53. See Jim Efstathiou Jr., Taxpayers Pay as Fracking Trucks Overwhelm Rural
Cow Paths, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-05-15/taxpayers-pay-as-fracking-trucks-overwhelm-rural-cow-paths-1.html.
54. Vicki Vaughan, Truckers Wanted for Eagle Ford Shale Jobs, HOUS.
CHRON. (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.chron.com/business/article/Truckers-wantedfor-Eagle-Ford-Shale-jobs-3478594.php.
55. See Daugherty, supra note 30; see also North Dakota Boomtown, supra
note 30.
56. The “oil curse” refers to the trend observed in some oil rich countries of
reduced economic performance after discovery of oil. For a full description of its
many variants and potential causes, see MICHAEL L. ROSS, THE OIL CURSE: HOW
PETROLEUM WEALTH SHAPES THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS (2012).
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quiet communities.57 Oil and gas companies have tried to minimize
these effects by placing so-called “man camps” away from existing
towns, but some of these effects persist nevertheless.
Finally, shale gas production releases methane and volatile organic
chemicals (VOCs) into the atmosphere through leaks in gas capture,
gathering, storage and transmission equipment. Methane is an
extremely potent greenhouse gas.58 Depending upon the volume of
methane releases from any particular natural gas production
operation, those releases may obviate any greenhouse gas emissions
gains associated with the substitution of natural gas for coal in
electricity production or other industrial operations. However, as
described in the next section, there remains considerable uncertainty
about the magnitude and climate effects of these so-called fugitive
methane emissions.59
B. The Disputed Effects of Fracking
The nature and magnitude of some of fracking’s other effects
remain in dispute. Nor has the growing scientific literature examining
these effects helped the combatants in the fracking debate to find
common ground. To the contrary, each side of the debate draws very
different conclusions from that literature.
1. The Combatants
Concern about the risks of fracking has spawned countless local
opposition groups in communities where shale gas is produced. Some
local governments have enacted ordinances banning fracking in their
cities and towns,60 while other local governments have been
57. Peter Foster & Alastair Good, Boomtown USA, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 25,
2013, 12:45 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/fracking/10464709/
Boomtown-USA-how-fracking-jumpstarted-Williston.html.
58. Since methane is among the most potent greenhouse gases—its heat
trapping abilities far exceed that of carbon dioxide on a molecule by molecule
basis—these methane emissions have the potential to erase any greenhouse gas
emissions gains associated with switching from coal-fired power to natural gasfired power.
59. See infra Part I.B. for a discussion of this issue.
60. This, in turn has triggered litigation challenging those bans on preemption
or other grounds. The FracTracker website keeps track of anti-fracking ordinances
in New York State, for example. Current High Volume Horizontal Hydraulic
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generally supportive of fracking, mainly on economic development
grounds.61 The major national environmental groups have been split
over the relative merits of shale gas production,62 and none have
joined local and single-issue groups in support of a national ban.63
Indeed, one commentator speaks of the “divided heart of the antifracking movement,” distinguishing “pragmatists” seeking reform
from “idealists” seeking to ban fracking.64 The Environmental
Fracturing Drilling Bans and Moratoria in NY State, FRACTRACKER,
http://www.fractracker.org/maps/ny-moratoria (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). See
also Andrew Harris, Colorado Cities Sued over Fracking Bans by Oil and Gas
Group, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2013-12-03/colorado-cities-sued-over-fracking-ban-by-oil-gas-group.
61. Id.
62. As far as I am aware, no major national environmental group supports a
national ban on fracking. The Natural Resources Defense Council has adopted the
role of helping local communities oppose fracking. See, e.g., Don’t Get Fracked,
NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNS., http://www.nrdc.org/health/drilling (last visited
Nov. 14, 2013). The Sierra Club has established its Fracking Regulation Action
Center, a website designed to provide information to local communities “to help
secure strong safeguards for fracking.” FRAC: Fracking Regulatory Action Center,
SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/naturalgas/rulemaking (last visited Nov.
14, 2013). The Environmental Defense Fund, by contrast, has been generally
supportive of responsible shale gas production, though it continues to study the
problem of methane leakage. See Rob Wile, The Environmental Defense Fund
Comes Out in Support of Fracking, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/environmental-defense-fund-supports-fracking2012-9.
63. Perhaps the highest-profile proponent of a ban is 350.org, a national group
focused on climate change. One lesser-known national group, Food and Water
Watch, also vigorously opposes fracking. The group publishes a number of fact
sheets which allege a close connection between fracking and severe environmental
harm. See, e.g., Waste: The Soft and Dirty Underbelly of Fracking, FOOD & WATER
WATCH
(Apr.
2012),
http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/
UnderbellyOfFracking.pdf (of which the major headings are “The Fracking
Nightmare,” “Rivers of Toxic Wastewater,” and “Mountains of Toxic Waste”).
64. Adam Briggle, Should Cities Ban Fracking?, SLATE MAG. (Dec. 24, 2012,
9:00
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/12/
longmont_co_has_banned_fracking_is_that_a_good_idea.html. See also Richard
A. Muller & Elizabeth A. Muller, Why Every Serious Environmentalist Should
Favor Fracking, CTR. FOR POL’Y STUDIES (2013), http://www.cps.org.uk/files/
reports/original/131202135150-WhyEverySeriousEnvironmentalistShouldFavour
Fracking.pdf (chronicling the environmental benefits of substituting gas for other
fossil fuels).
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Defense Fund’s (EDF) participation in “The Center for Sustainable
Shale Gas Development,” and collaboration with energy companies
and philanthropic organizations to develop performance standards for
shale gas production, has further exposed this division in the
environmental community.65 However, despite the failure of major
environmental organizations to call for an outright ban, many
entertainment industry figures have embraced the idealists’ position,
often framing the issue as one of people versus profits. The academy
award-nominated documentary Gasland helped to rally opposition to
fracking. The film depicts a variety of environmental ills in gas
production regions and implies that fracking is responsible for those
ills. For example, residents who live near natural gas drilling are
shown lighting their tap water on fire, suggesting that drilling
operations caused methane to leach into their well water. Similarly,
the movie shows the mayor of a Texas town who believes that
pollution associated with fracking operations has increased the
incidence of serious illnesses among his constituents.66 In a 2012
New York Times op-ed piece entitled “Destroying Precious Land for
Gas,” Sean Ono Lennon contended that fracking “inevitably leaks
toxic chemicals into the air and water,”67 a notion echoed by actorturned-activist Mark Ruffalo, now a leader of the anti-fracking
movement.68 These disparate opposition groups and prominent
65. See Susan Phillips, Fractures in the Anti-Fracking Community, ST. IMPACT
(May 21, 2013, 6:19 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/05/21/
fractures-in-the-anti-fracking-movement (reporting that other environmental groups
are “shunning” EDF for their participation in the regulatory effort with industry).
66. Specifically, the film interviews Calvin Tillman, then the mayor of Dish,
Texas, and now an anti-fracking activist. See GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films
2010).
67. Lennon, supra note 20.
68. Ruffalo has said that “[i]t has yet to be proven that we can frack without
destroying our water and air. If it can be done, why aren’t they doing it?” See Jeff
Goodell, Mark Ruffalo on the Fracking Fight, ROLLING STONE (May 16, 2012,
10:29 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/national-affairs/markruffalo-on-the-fracking-fight-20120516. See also Mireya Navarro, Ruffalo
Embraces a Role Closer to Home, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/fashion/mark-ruffalo-actor-embraces-anti-frackingrole.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing Ruffalo’s role as an organizer of the
anti-fracking movement within the entertainment industry). Most recently, the
feature film Promised Land focuses on the ethical quandaries facing a “land man”
(one who secures mineral rights from property owners) played by Matt Damon.
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entertainment industry figures have coalesced under the umbrella of
an organization called “Americans Against Fracking,”69 dedicated to
banning the use of hydraulic fracturing in shale gas production70
because fracking poses “a direct and immediate threat to the drinking
water, air, climate, food, health and economies of communities
across the United States.”71
The counterparts to anti-fracking activists are mainly those who
stand to benefit from shale gas production—industry representatives,
landowners who have leased their land for production, and some of
those who benefit from the secondary economic effects of the shale
gas boom described in the previous section.72 An oil and gas trade
group has launched a web site called “Energy In Depth” which is
“focused on getting the facts out about the promise and potential of
responsibly developing” shale gas. Much of the Energy in Depth
website is devoted to “debunking” the claims of fracking’s opponents
and challenging new criticisms leveled against fracking.73
In the middle stand state and federal politicians and regulators,
who have reacted to the boom in shale gas production in more
PROMISED LAND (Focus Features 2012). In the film, Damon’s employer takes a
particularly cynical approach to its dealings with landowners.
69. The organization’s advisory board consists of filmmaker Josh Fox, singer
Natalie Merchant, actor Mark Ruffalo, and ecologist Susan Steingraber. Advisory
Board, AMERICANS AGAINST FRACKING, www.americansagainstfracking.org/
about-the-coalition/advisory-board (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
70. The “About the Coalition” section of the Americans Against Fracking
website says that “[o]ur goal, quite simply, is to ban fracking. To that end, we
support federal, state and local efforts to ban fracking, enact moratoriums and to
stop practices that facilitate fracking like natural gas exports, frac sand mining and
the construction of pipelines.” About the Coalition, AMERICANS AGAINST
FRACKING, http://www.americansagainstfracking.org/about-the-coalition (last
visited Nov. 14, 2013).
71. Id.
72. The signatories on a letter supporting fracking sent to President Obama in
2011 offer a representative snapshot of pro-fracking groups. They include
manufacturers, chambers of commerce, as well as oil and gas interests. See Letter
from 60 Plus et al. to Barack H. Obama, President of the United States of America
(Sep. 20, 2011), available at http://www.slideshare.net/MarcellusDN/hydraulicfracturing-jobs-and-security-letter-to-obama-92011?utm_
source=slideshow02&utm_medium=ssemail&utm_campaign=share_slideshow_log
gedout.
73. See ENERGY IN DEPTH, www.energyindepth.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
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measured ways, revising and strengthening environmental rules in
response to new information about the environmental risks of the
industry as the information arises.74 For example, the states of Texas
and Pennsylvania, both experiencing shale gas production booms,
have revised their regulations in the last couple of years to close
perceived regulatory gaps.75 In New York, a ban remains in place
pending further study; but New York’s ban is the exception rather
than the rule. At the federal level, the Obama Administration’s
reaction to the shale boom was centered on the Secretary of Energy’s
Advisory Board (SEAB), Subcommittee on Shale Gas Production.
After studying the issue, the SEAB subcommittee produced a list of
recommendations designed to promote responsible Shale gas
development.76 Many of the subcommittee’s recommendations
require action by other governmental entities, some of which have
been undertaken. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has announced its intention to strengthen its Clean Water Act
rules governing disposal of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing
operations,77 and Clean Air Act rules governing fugitive VOC
(including methane compound) emissions from natural gas
operations.78 Meanwhile, the EPA is engaged in a long-term study of
the effects of fracking, the results of which are expected in 2014.79
74. Hannah Wiseman, a leading authority on state regulation of shale gas
production, calls this process “regulatory adaptation.” See Hannah Wiseman,
Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229 (2010);
Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Fracking in Oil and Gas
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115
(2009).
75. See, e.g., Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical Disclosure Requirements, 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (2013); Press Release, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP
Announces Final Air Quality Permit for Natural Gas Operations, Proposes New
Environmental Controls (Jan. 31, 2013), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/
portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=19840&typeid=1.
76. SHALE GAS PROD. SUBCOMM., SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, SECOND NINETY DAY REPORT (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/111811_final_report.pdf.
77. Nicholas Kusnetz, EPA Plans to Issue Rules Covering Fracking
Wastewater,
PROPUBLICA
(Oct.
20,
2011,
5:01
PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/epa-plans-to-issue-rules-covering-frackingwastewater.
78. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 FED. REG.
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2. Water Pollution
As suggested by Gasland, much of the early opposition to fracking
focused on concern that fracking would cause water contamination.
Three high profile water contamination incidents in shale gas
production regions have fed concern about water pollution risks. The
first involved the contamination of drinking water wells with
methane in Dimock, Pennsylvania in 2009.80 Cabot Oil and Gas
Corporation, a shale gas producer, entered into a consent decree in
which it agreed to pay a fine and to provide fresh water to residents
of Dimock. Fracking proponents contend that fracking was not the
cause of the Dimock contamination. Nevertheless, the incident
figures prominently in anti-fracking campaigns. Also in 2009, an
algae bloom in Dunkard Creek in West Virginia resulted in a massive
fish kill. The EPA and the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection concluded that drainage from a nearby coal
mine caused the spill, but some fracking activists (and an EPA
biologist) believe that wastewater from fracking operations may be
the cause.81 Finally, in 2011, the EPA concluded that fracturing fluids
49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63) (creating new
source performance standards for onshore natural gas processing plants and
finalizing risk- and technology-review procedures for natural gas production,
transmission, and storage). Existing equipment standards can be found at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60 subpart KKK.
79. For outline of the EPA’s study plan, see OFF. OF RES. AND DEV., EPA,
PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES (2011), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/
class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hf_study_plan_110211_final_508.pdf.
80. See Michael Rubinkam, Pa. Moves to Limit Air Emissions from Gas
Industry, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://news.yahoo.com/
pa-moves-limit-air-emissions-163446600.html. Similar claims have been brought
against Southwest Energy Production Company and Atlas Energy. See Berish v.
Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Jon Hurdle,
Pennsylvania Lawsuit Says Drilling Polluted Water, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2009, 9:37
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/09/us-fracking-suitidUSTRE5A80PP20091109. While the settlement did not establish the cause of the
methane contamination, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
subsequently banned Cabot from using hydraulic fracturing in the region.
81. Mike Soraghan, In Fish-Kill Mystery, EPA Scientist Points at Shale
Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/12/
12greenwire-in-fish-kill-mystery-epa-scientist-points-at-s86563.html?pagewanted=all.
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had contaminated a drinking water aquifer near the town of Pavilion,
Wyoming,82 though the industry disputes that conclusion.83
Meanwhile, researchers have turned their attention to the risk of
water contamination from fracking. A 2011 Cornell University study
found a higher incidence of methane contamination in drinking-water
wells located close to natural gas wells,84 though that study did not
distinguish between biogenic methane (found at shallow depths) and
thermogenic methane (found at greater depths, where fracking
occurs). Nor did the study sample wells before fracking operations
commenced, leaving open the possibility that the methane was in the
groundwater beforehand. A 2011 Pennsylvania State University
study sampled drinking-water wells before and after nearby fracking
operations, and found no significant increase in well contamination
from either methane or fracking fluid constituents.85 Earlier findings
by MIT researchers reached similar, though tentative, conclusions.86
The so-called “Duke Study” sampled well water before and after
fracking and reached mixed conclusions, finding no evidence of

82. See DOMINIC C. DIGIULIO ET AL., EPA OFF. OF RES. AND DEV., DRAFT:
INVESTIGATION OF GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING
(2011),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/EPA_
ReportOnPavillion_Dec-8-2011.pdf; see also Jim Efstahiou Jr., Gas-Fracking
Fracturing Chemicals Detected in Wyoming Aquifer, EPA Says, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2011, 3:50 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-08/gasfracking-chemicals-detected-in-wyoming-aquifer-epa-says.html.
83. The Independent Petroleum Association of America raised questions about
the EPA study, which provoked a dialogue with EPA. See, Chris Tucker, *Update
XIII* Six—Actually, Seven—Questions for EPA on Pavilion, ENERGY IN DEPTH
(Feb. 20, 2013, 9:09 AM), http://www.energyindepth.org/six-questions-for-epa-onpavillion/.
84. Robert W. Howarth et al., Letter, Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas
Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations, 106 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 679
(2011).
85. ELIZABETH W. BOYER ET AL., CTR. FOR RURAL PA., THE IMPACT OF
MARCELLUS GAS DRILLING ON RURAL DRINKING WATER SUPPLIES 16–18 (2011),
http://www.rural.palegislature.us/documents/reports/Marcellus_and_drinking_wate
r_2011_rev.pdf.
86. ERNEST J. MONIZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 39 (2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/
NaturalGas_Report.pdf.
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groundwater contamination by fracking fluids or wastewater,87 but
some evidence that levels of thermogenic methane were higher in
shallow groundwater aquifers near natural gas-production wells than
elsewhere in the same aquifers.88 The authors could not say how long
ago the thermogenic methane found its way to shallower depths,
however, or whether gas drilling was connected with its presence
there.89 In 2012, researchers at the State University of New York at
Stony Brook sought to quantify the risks of groundwater
contamination by estimating the probabilities of various types of
accidents that could result in a spill, and extrapolating from those
probabilities to produce projected volumes of fracking wastewater
that might find their way into groundwater or surface waters in the
Marcellus Shale.90 The authors concluded that the risks were
“substantial.” Most recently, the U.S. Geological Survey compared
concentrations of methane and other constituents in 127 water wells
in the Fayetteville shale gas production region before and after shale
gas production operations, finding no evidence of contamination in
either methane or fracking fluid constituents and wells.91
3. Air Pollution
Gasland raised the question of whether fracking produces
dangerous air emissions (from truck traffic, compressors, etc.), and
anti-fracking groups have charged that fracking is associated with

87. See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L.
ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8175 (2011) (“we found no evidence for contamination of the
shallow wells near active drilling sites from deep brines and/or fracturing fluids.”).
88. See id. at 8174 (“The data do suggest gas-phase transport of methane
upward to the shallow groundwater zones sampled for this study . . . .”).
89. See id. at 8175.
90. Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated with
Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1383 (2011),
available at http://www.slideshare.net/MarcellusDN/paper-water-pollution-riskassociated-with-natural-gas-extraction-from-the-marcellus-shale.
91. Timothy M. Kresse et al., Shallow Groundwater Quality and Geochemistry
in the Fayetteville Shale Gas-Production Area, North-Central Arkansas, 2011,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. ET AL. (2012), http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2012/5273/
sir2012-5273.pdf.
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increased incidence of breast cancer in parts of Texas.92 However,
these claims have been widely criticized by a variety of public health
professionals.93 More recently, two studies focusing on air pollution
near gas sites in Colorado indicate that airborne levels of VOCs at
those sites exceed national standards,94 or that levels are high enough
to warrant further study.95 Industry critics, however, dispute those
conclusions claiming that neither study measures the relative
contribution of fracking operations and other nearby sources, such as
interstate highway traffic.96
Fracking’s opponents have also begun to challenge the notion that
a transition from coal to natural gas will have climate benefits. Critics
point to the fact that methane is itself a potent greenhouse gas, and
note that methane can escape from natural gas pipelines and
equipment, and from fracked wells during the well closure97 process.
92. Peggy Heinkel-Wolfe, Breast Cancer Rate Climbs Up, DENTON REC.CHRON. (Aug. 31, 2011, 3:19 PM), http://www.dentonrc.com/local-news/specialprojects/gas-well-drilling-headlines/20110831-breast-cancer-rate-climbs-up.ece;
see also Jerving, supra note 20.
93. Begos, supra note 22.
94. Lisa Song, Hazardous Air Pollutants Detected near Fracking Sites,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2012, 7:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1203/hazardous-air-pollutants-detected-near-fracking-sites.html; David Kelly, Study
Shows Air Emissions near Fracking Sites May Pose Health Risk, U. COLO. DENV.
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.ucdenver.edu/about/newsroom/newsreleases/Pages/
health-impacts-of-fracking-emissions.aspx; see also Mark Jaffe, CU Denver Study
Links Fracking to Higher Concentration of Air Pollutants, DENV. POST (Mar. 20,
2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_20210720/cudenver-study-links-fracking-higher-concentration-air.
95. Theo Colborn et al., An Exploratory Study of Air Quality near Natural Gas
Operations,
ENDOCRINE
DISRUPTION
EXCHANGE
11
(2012),
http://endocrinedisruption.org/assets/media/documents/HERA12137NGAirQualityManuscriptforwebwithfigures.pdf; Cathy Proctor, Colorado to
Study Air Pollution from Oil and Gas Operations, DENV. BUS. J. (Jan. 9, 2013,
11:39 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2013/01/09/colorado-tostudy-air-pollution-from.html?page=all.
96. Steve Everley, *UPDATE IV* Eight Worst Inputs Used in Colorado Health
Study, ENERGY IN DEPTH (May 16, 2012, 9:09 AM), http://
www.energyindepth.org/non-elite-eight-worst-inputs-used-in-new-colorado-healthstudy.
97. Closure refers to the period when the well has stopped producing flowback
water and is ready to be connected to gathering systems and produce only gas. As
flowback water diminishes, more gas is found in the mixture. The EPA’s recent
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More natural gas production, they reason, means more methane in the
atmosphere. The relative climate benefits of switching from coal and
oil to gas, however, depend upon (1) relative methane leakage rates
for these various fuels prior to combustion, and (2) how we compare
greenhouse effects of methane to those of carbon dioxide (the
primary greenhouse gas byproduct of coal, oil, and natural gas
combustion). The combatants in the fracking debate disagree about
both of these issues.
The scholarly debate on the methane leakage issue is just getting
underway. One early study estimated that as much as eight percent of
the methane produced from natural gas wells escapes into the
atmosphere as the result of leaks or venting, an amount that could
undermine the climate change advantages of natural gas.98 That
study, however, has attracted considerable criticism in the scholarly
community. A report from Cambridge Energy Research Associates
contends that the Howarth study is plagued by measurement and
methodological errors that resulted in an overestimate of methane
emissions from gas production operations. The alleged errors include
failing to distinguish between methane emission rates from venting
versus flaring of gas, failing to account for the standard industry
practice of capturing methane in flowback water, and more.99 The
EPA estimates that methane emissions from natural gas-production
facilities comprise less than three percent of American greenhouse
gas emissions annually,100 but studies underway by the National
rule on fugitive emissions from gas facilities would reduce methane emissions
associated with closure. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector, supra note 78.
98. See Howarth, supra note 84.
99. See CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RES. ASSOCIATES, MISMEASURING METHANE:
ESTIMATING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM UPSTREAM NATURAL GAS
DEVELOPMENT (private report on file with author); see also David A. Kirchgessner
et al., Estimate of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, 35
CHEMOSPHERE 1365 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/ch14/
related/methane.pdf.
100. For a discussion of EPA’s calculations, see Ramon A. Alvarez, et al.,
Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 6435 (2012). The data used calculations
taken from Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions, EPA,
http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html (last updated Sept. 9,
2013) (noting that methane emissions accounted for about nine percent of all U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions from human activities and thirty percent of U.S. methane
emissions come from natural gas and petroleum systems). See also KELSI

2013]

RESPONSIBLE SHALE GAS PRODUCTION

165

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration have challenged those
estimates as too low.101 A recent University of Texas study
measuring 2012 emissions at hundreds of natural gas production sites
(many of which used reduced-emission well completion methods)
concluded that leakage was lower than the EPA estimate.102 Another
recent study measured 2008–09 emissions from conventional natural
gas production sites in Texas and Oklahoma, and concluded that
emissions rates were higher than EPA estimates.103 Methane leakage
may be a technically tractable problem,104 since companies have an
economic incentive to capture fugitive emissions; and the EPA’s
recently-promulgated rule on fugitive emissions from natural gas
facilities should reduce leakage rates (whatever those rates currently
are).105 Meanwhile, states and the EPA are considering additional
regulation to address the problem.106
BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., METHANE CAPTURE: OPTIONS FOR
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION REDUCTION 23 (2009), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/130799.pdf.
101. See Gabrielle Petron et al., Hydrocarbon Emissions Characterization in the
Colorado Front Range—A Pilot Study, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. (forthcoming 2012)
(suggesting that existing estimates of fugitive methane emissions from gas
operations are underestimates). But cf. Michael Levi, Yellow Flags on a New
Methane Study, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://
blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/02/13/yellow-flags-on-a-new-methane-study (identifying
methodological problems with the Petron study). Recently, the NOAA group
announced results from a study of methane emissions in Utah that are consistent
with the Howarth data. See Jeff Tollefson, Methane Leaks Erode Green
Credentials of Natural Gas, 493 NATURE 12 (2013), available at
http://www.nature.com/news/methane-leaks-erode-green-credentials-of-naturalgas-1.12123.
102. David T. Allen, et al., Measurements of Methane Emissions at Natural Gas
Production Sites in the United States, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCI. 17768 (2013).
103. Scott M. Miller, et al., Anthropogenic Emissions of Methane in the United
States, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 17768 (2013).
104. See Jim Marston, Elements: Shale Drilling Can Be A Win-Win, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 21, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.statesman.com/news/
news/opinion/elements-shale-drilling-can-be-a-win-win/nTyhF
(detailing
the
Environmental Defense Fund’s qualified support for shale gas production, with
controls on methane leakage).
105. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 FED. REG.
49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63); see also Adam
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Methane leakage rates aside, the combatants in the fracking debate
cannot agree on the relative climate impacts of methane versus
carbon dioxide emissions—the so-called “methane multiplier.”107 A
molecule of carbon dioxide emitted today persists in the atmosphere
for approximately 100 years, compared to only twenty years for
methane. During its 100 years in the atmosphere, that CO2 molecule
will trap roughly twenty-five times the heat of a methane molecule
emitted today. However, during the twenty years of the methane
molecule’s existence in the atmosphere,108 the methane molecule will
trap roughly seventy-two times the heat of the CO2 molecule (though
the CO2 molecule will continue to trap heat for another eighty
years).109 Anti-fracking groups use the 72x number (and, often, a
Orford, EPA to Regulate Air Emissions from Hydraulic Fracturing As Industry
Comes Under Scrutiny, MARTEN L. (May 29, 2012), http://www.martenlaw.com/
newsletter/20120529-air-emissions-from-hydraulic-fracturing.
106. See, e.g., Rubinkam, supra note 80 (describing Pennsylvania’s effort to
tighten methane leakage rules). Several states would like the EPA to further tighten
its rules, or implement them more quickly. See Kevin Begos, NY, 6 Other States
Suing EPA Over Drilling Methane, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 11, 2012, 6:40 PM),
available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ny-6-other-states-suing-epa-over-drillingmethane (recounting litigation aimed at forcing more action on methane leakage by
the EPA).
107. See generally Tom Zeller Jr., Methane Losses Stir Debate on Natural Gas,
N.Y.
TIMES
GREEN
BLOG
(Apr.
12,
2011,
9:01
AM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/fugitive-methane-stirs-debate-onnatural-gas (providing a detailed summary of the “methane multiplier” issue).
108. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, TS.2.5 NET
GLOBAL RADIATIVE FORCING: GLOBAL WARMING POTENTIALS AND PATTERNS OF
FORCING, IN CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/tssts-2-5.html;
see also Beyond Kyoto: Why Climate Policy Needs to Adopt the 20-Year Impact of
Methane,
ECO-CYCLE,
www.ecocycle.org/files/pdfs/
methane20yearimpactecocycle.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
109. See Steven Hamburg, Measuring Fugitive Methane Emissions from
Fracking, ECOWATCH (Jan. 4, 2013), http://ecowatch.org/2013/fugitive-methaneemissions-fracking; Thomas Schueneman, EDF, Chevron Agree Natural Gas
Fracking Here to Stay, Part Ways on Fugitive Methane Emissions and Short-Term
Impacts of Shale Boom, GLOBAL WARMING IS REAL (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://globalwarmingisreal.com/2013/02/06/edf-chevron-agree-natural-gasfracking-here-to-stay-part-ways-on-impact-of-methane-emissions; see also Science
and Research, AM. ENERGY COAL., http://americanenergycoalition.com/
scienceandresearch (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
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larger 105x multiplier)110 when discussing the climate impacts of
methane; if one wants to compare the full effects of each source of
emissions over their entire lifetimes in the atmosphere, then the 25x
multiplier is more appropriate.
Thus, there remain open questions about the impacts of fracking on
air and groundwater. These debates, however, concern relatively
narrow questions, and stand in contrast to the much broader and
bolder claims made by combatants in the shale gas policy debate.
Whereas disagreements in the scientific community play out in the
language of cool analysis, the larger policy debate is characterized by
a healthy dose of moral outrage and framed largely in ethical terms.
II. RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMPLICATED ETHICS
OF FRACKING
Many oil and gas companies invest heavily in corporate social
responsibility-investments that address the environmental and social
impacts of their actions, often going beyond legal requirements.111
110. Those who use the 105x multiplier cite work by Drew Shindell, comparing
the effects of carbon emissions from coal and gas by mass over a shorter than
twenty-year time period. See Drew T. Shindell et al., Improved Attribution of
Climate Forcing to Emissions, 326 SCI. 716, 717 (Oct. 30, 2009). For examples of
authors using the 105x multiplier, see California, Fracking and Tomorrow’s
Energy, EARTHACTION (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.earthaction.org/2013/02/
california-fracking-and-tomorrows-energy.html; Iris Marie Bloom, Fracked Gas
Speeds Climate Crash; Extreme Flaring Adds to Greenhouse Emissions,
PROTECTING
OUR
WATERS
(Nov.
28,
2011),
http://
protectingourwaters.wordpress.com/2011/11/28/fracked-gas-speeds-climate-crashextreme-flaring-adds-to-greenhouse-emissions; Richard Matthews, Natural Gas is
Not Clean Energy, GLOBAL WARMING IS REAL (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://globalwarmingisreal.com/2012/02/15/natural-gas-is-not-clean-energy; Rising
Tide—Vancouver, Coast Salish Territories Opposes Fracking and Stands with
Front-line Communities Against LNG Expansion, RISING TIDE VANCOUVER COAST
SALISH TERRITORIES (Feb. 25, 2013), http://calamites.resist.ca/?p=329; Stephen
Leahy, Shale Gas a Bridge to More Global Warming, INTER PRESS SERV. (Jan. 24,
2012),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/01/shale-gas-a-bridge-to-more-globalwarming.
111. For a general discussion of corporate social responsibility in the oil and gas
industry, see David B. Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas
Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 84
(2011).
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These investments are alternately explained as investments in
reducing legal or political risk, reactions to companies’ social and
environmental missteps in the past, sincere efforts to operate
sustainably, and public relations.112 How, then, might we define
responsible shale gas production? The term “responsible” or
“responsibility” implies a duty to someone or something, which in
turn evokes at least some sort of general notion of ethics or
morality—that is, a duty beyond that imposed in law. Risk regulation
offers one approach to this question of what individuals, firms and
policymakers ought to do, and suggests that they ought to choose
courses of action that minimize risks to the public (the precautionary
principle). This is, of course, distinct from the question of what
individuals and firms are likely to actually do in particular situations,
and why they do it; that is the domain of the behavioral sciences,
such as economics, behavioral psychology, and the neurosciences.113
The next section explores the relative risks of fracking, which have
been under-emphasized in the fracking debate; Part II.B examines the
debate’s behavioral dimensions as a way of understanding why
relative risks are often ignored.
A. Risk Regulation and the Fracking Debate
One cannot make responsible decisions about how to regulate a
particular risk, like shale gas production, without recognizing the
larger context in which that risk exists. It makes little sense to spend
$2X to eliminate a small risk when one could spend $X to eliminate a
much larger risk. Yet we sometimes make this kind of a logical
choice because the smaller risk appears to be more salient or looms
larger to more influential subsets of society.114 Indeed, there is a
112. Id. at 61–70 (discussing the various rationales for corporate social
responsibility investments and the difficulty of discerning which are driving
investments).
113. Thus, for example, while economists explain behavior by focusing on the
rational, fully informed utility-maximizing individual (“rational man” or homo
economicus), behavioral psychologists focus on the elements of behavior that are
irrational or not well explained by the assumption of rationality. A behavioral
analysis of a decision may yield predictions about the course of action people are
likely to take, or plausible explanations of (ethical or unethical) behavior.
114. Of course, the literature on risk assessment and management is enormous.
Perhaps the most succinct description of the sometime irrationality of risk
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myopic quality to the policy debate over fracking. Discussions of
whether to permit or prohibit shale gas production often focus on the
most immediate impacts (costs and benefits), both temporally and
geographically, without regard to the equally important, broader
impacts of more or less shale gas production. Rather, policymakers
ought to weigh the full costs and benefits of permitting, regulating, or
banning fracking, including the longer-term, more widely distributed
costs and benefits.
Such an analysis starts with the recognition that energy investment
and production decisions are not made by government policymakers,
for policy reasons: rather, they are made by the private sector, for
economic reasons. That is, the energy industry produces fuels at
different rates depending upon their relative profitability over time;
and invests in the production of different fuels at different rates
depending upon projections of their relative profitability over time. In
capitalist systems, governments do very little in the way of direct
investment in, or production of, energy; rather governments try to
influence private sector investment and production decisions by
regulating or subsidizing so as to raise (or lower) the cost of
producing or using specific fuels. Thus, regulation that raises the
relative cost of producing or using one fuel, all else equal, benefits
other competing fuels.
Natural gas competes with coal, renewables, and nuclear power in
the electric generation sector, and with oil in the transportation
sector. The shale gas boom has brought dramatic change in the
relative profitability of producing natural gas. Lower natural gas
prices make the construction of natural gas-fired electric generating
facilities a much more profitable proposition, to the disadvantage of
coal-fired, nuclear, and renewable electric generation facilities.
Similarly, the prospect of low natural gas prices into the foreseeable
future is starting to give a boost to natural gas-fueled vehicles;115
should that development continue, it will work to the relative
regulation policy is that provided by then Judge Breyer in his book on the subject.
See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993).
115. This is particularly true of truck and bus fleets that return to a common
location for refueling. See Ken Silverstein, All Roads Lead to Natural Gas-Fueled
Cars and Trucks, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2012, 9:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kensilverstein/2012/12/15/all-roads-lead-to-natural-gas-fueled-cars-and-trucks.
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disadvantage of gasoline-fueled vehicles. Therefore, regulation that
increases the cost of producing natural gas, or restricts supply, will
increase prices, to the relative benefit of those competing fuels;
similarly, regulation that increases the relative cost of producing
other fuels benefits natural gas.
This is an important point. Proponents of wind-powered and
nuclear energy contend that inexpensive natural gas has dramatically
slowed development of these cleaner energy resources. A few years
ago many thought that nuclear energy was on the cusp of a
renaissance, as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission entertained
applications for new plants for the first time in decades. However,
optimism has waned as investors worried about the ability of nuclear
power to compete with cheap natural gas fired electricity. For their
part, wind and solar generation continue to grow,116 in part because
the marginal costs of producing electricity from those sources is
nearly zero,117 meaning that wind and solar power tend to be
dispatched to the grid (and therefore purchased) whenever they are
available. Furthermore, the total cost of generating electricity from
these sources has continued to decline, and tax credits and renewable
portfolio standards seem likely to continue to preserve (or drive) the
market for wind and solar power. On the other hand, wind and solar
are intermittent resources, and must be supported by some
combination of more reliable generating technologies, demand
reduction, or electricity storage during those times when the wind is
not blowing or the sun is not shining. Right now, the most costcompetitive of these support options is natural gas-fired power.118

116. See RON PERNICK ET AL., CLEAN EDGE, CLEAN ENERGY TRENDS 2012
(2012),
http://www.cleanedge.com/sites/default/files/CETrends2012_Final_
Web.pdf; see also Toby D. Couture, & David Jacobs, The Future of Electricity
Markets, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Feb. 18, 2013), http://
www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/02/the-future-ofelectricity-markets.
117. Couture & Jacobs, supra note 116.
118. Combined cycle natural gas turbines ramp up and down more efficiently
than coal-fired or nuclear plants, and are cheaper than batteries, pumped-storage
hydro, flywheels, compressed air, or other forms of energy storage to complement
wind and solar. For a fuller discussion of this intermittency problem, see David B.
Spence, Regulation, Climate Change, and the Electric Grid, 3 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 267, 288–92 (2011–12).
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However, many people aspire to an energy future free of fossil
fuels, in which the problem of intermittency that afflicts wind and
solar power has been overcome. Some may see natural gas as a
bridge to that future, but only a bridge; they worry that gas has
become so inexpensive that it is deterring progress toward the
ultimate goal of a renewables-based energy mix. That logic works
only in the very long term, however, and seems likely to ignore more
pressing (and environmentally significant) tradeoffs. Right now, an
even more important energy marketplace dynamic is the competition
between natural gas and coal in the electric generation system. The
ongoing scientific debate over the long-term climate impacts of
increased natural gas production (described in Part I) focuses on this
a very dynamic, but only on its climate impacts. Because natural gasfired power plants produce much less carbon dioxide than coal-fired
plants,119 the displacement of coal by natural gas in the electric
generation sector in recent years is apparently yielding climate
benefits, according to the International Energy Agency.120 However,
if fugitive methane emissions from natural gas production are
sufficiently high, and if those fugitive emissions cannot be controlled
economically, increased natural gas production may yield no climate
benefits at all; to the contrary, it may exacerbate climate change. No
credible sources are making that claim just yet, but combatants in the
fracking debate have seized on the scholarly disagreement over the
rate of leakage to argue the climate change merits of replacing coal
with natural gas in our energy mix. If policymakers are to craft
regulation that maximizes the net benefits of natural gas production,
they will need to rely on good scientific analyses of the methane
leakage issue, and good information about the costs of addressing it.
No consensus yet exists on those issues.
Of course, our relative use of different fuels has environmental and
health consequences beyond those associated with climate change.
Indeed, climate issues aside, the displacement of coal-fired electric
generation by natural gas-fired generation seems likely to yield
enormous public welfare benefits. Indeed, when scholars try to
quantify the health impacts (premature deaths, illness, and injuries)
119. Natural Gas: Electricity from Natural Gas, EPA http://www.epa.gov/
cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/natural-gas.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2013).
120. See Chazan, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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from coal extraction, processing, transport, and combustion, the
results border on shocking. A 2009 National Academy of Sciences
study estimated the annual non-climate related external damages
from 406 coal-fired power plants to be $62 billion, or about 3.2 cents
per kwh, representing about thirty to fifty percent of the average cost
of electricity.121 A recent study reported in the Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences122 (a multidisciplinary scientific journal),
examined the health effects of the coal industry on a lifecycle basis.
The authors, who comprise of researchers from various public health
and academic institutions,123 estimated that these externalities cost
the American public as much as half a trillion dollars each year,124
and “conservatively” estimated that if these costs were internalized
the price of electricity generated from coal would “double or
triple.”125 Another recent study, reported in the American Economic
Review, developed a framework for comparing (quantifying) the
damages associated with non-greenhouse gas air pollution emissions
from 820 industries (including all of the major polluting industries)
with the value added to the economy by those industries.126 The
authors concluded that the net benefits127 of seven of those industries
(including oil- and coal-fired power plants, but not natural gas-fired

121. News Release, Nat’l Academy Of Sci., Report Examines Hidden Health and
Environmental Costs of Energy Production and Consumption in U. S. 1 (Oct. 19,
2009),
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/NAS%20study%
20on%20costs%20of%20energy.pdf.
122. Melissa M. Ahern et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, in
1219 ECOLOGICAL ECON. REVIEWS 73 (Robert Costanza et al. eds., 2011).
123. These included the Harvard Medical School, the Harvard School of Public
Health, the Boston University School of Public Health, the Department of
Pharmacology at Washington State University, and the Department of Community
Medicine at West Virginia University.
124. Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI., 73, 73 (2011), http://solar.gwu.edu/index_files/
Resources_files/epstein_full%20cost%20of%20coal.pdf.
125. Id. at 93
126. Robert Mendelsohn et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the
United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649 (2011), available at http://
pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.101.5.1649.
127. More precisely, the authors expressed the results in terms of net costs—the
ratio of environmental damages to value added for each industry. See id. at 1665.
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power plants) were negative.128 The authors concluded further that
coal-fired combustion created by far the largest amount of
environmental damage, which they estimated at approximately $53
billion per year.129 By contrast, they estimated environmental
damages from natural gas-fired production to be less than $1 billion
per year.130 The authors estimated the environmental costs of coalfired generation to be approximately 2.8 cents per kilowatt hour
(cents/kwh), from oil-fired generation to be two cents/kwh, and from
natural gas-fired generation to be approximately 0.1 cents/kwh.131
This literature suggests that the bulk of the harm caused by coal
combustion is attributable to mortality resulting from emissions of
conventional air pollutants, primarily sulfur dioxide, fine particles,
and nitrogen oxides. By comparison, environmental harm from
greenhouse gas emissions pales in comparison, representing well
under one percent of the harm estimated in the American Economic
Review analysis. Other studies have reached similar conclusions,132
and offer further support for the notion that coal combustion imposes
very large mortality, morbidity and environmental costs on American
society, costs that dwarf those associated with natural gas-fired

128. See Id. The ratio of environmental damage to value added was higher for
oil-fired generation (5.13) and from coal-fired generation (2.20), and higher still for
solid waste combustion and incineration (6.72). However, the ratio for natural gasfired generation was less than .10, denoting a positive and if the cost ratio for that
industry. Id. at 1664.
129. Id. at 1667. The next largest amount of environmental damage was
associated with the livestock production industry, at $14.8 billion. Id. at 1665.
Since the authors did not report the environmental damage number for natural gasfired power production, it must be less than $4 billion per year. Id.
130. Id. at 1669.
131. Id.
132. Studies of the effects of coal on the states of Kentucky and West Virginia
concluded that the net benefits of coal to their states were negative. See, e.g.,
Melissa Fry Konty & Jason Bailey, The Impact of Coal on the Kentucky State
Budget, MOUNTAIN ASS’N FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV. 2 (2009) http://www.maced.org/
coal/documents/Impact_of_Coal-Exec_Summary.pdf. A study by the West
Virginia Center. For Budget and Policy and the Consulting Firm Downstream
Strategies reached a similar conclusion about the effects of coal on the West
Virginia state budget. See Researchers Push for Higher Taxes, Fees, Fines on
Coal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.wvgazette.com/
News/201009130914.
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power.133 These represent the benefits of increased reliance on
natural gas or electric power generation, and the opportunity costs of
any regulatory decisions that increase the relative cost of natural gas
has against coal.
When discussing responsible shale gas production, we neglect
these opportunity costs at our peril. Any clear eyed assessment of the
relative benefits and costs of shale gas production (and,
correspondingly, shale gas regulation) ought to include consideration
of these opportunity costs. Such an analysis is possible, in theory,
given reliable information about the costs and benefits of shale gas
production and other fuels. However, the point made by James
Madison in the quotation at the start of this essay suggests a problem
long understood by philosophers—namely, that our self-interest
clouds our ability to assess risks objectively. The uneven distribution
of the costs and benefits of fracking produces diverging
understandings of the magnitude of those costs and benefits, making
risk assessment difficult in practice. Recent work in the behavioral
sciences explains why that is in ways reminiscent of James
Madison’s language in Federalist No. 10.
B. Policymaking and the Behavioral Side of the Fracking Debate
It was psychologist Leon Festinger who coined the term cognitive
dissonance134 to describe the psychological discomfort we feel when
we are presented with two conflicting cognitions, or beliefs. We use
the companion term rationalization to describe the mental tricks we
play on ourselves in order to relieve that discomfort. At its simplest
level, rationalization can influence the fracking debate in
straightforward, almost obvious ways. For example, if I work for a
natural gas company and derive economic and psychological benefits
from my job, the notion that my work poses environmental risks to
others will produce cognitive dissonance. I would be much more
comfortable if my efforts to produce shale gas benefited not only me,
but also society as a whole; therefore, I am motivated to conclude
133. See Nat’l Acad. of Sci., supra note 121, at 2 (“burning natural gas generated
far less damage than coal, both overall and per kilowatt-hour of electricity
generated.”).
134. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
137–42 (1957).
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that the net social benefits of fracking are positive. Correspondingly,
if I would prefer not to endure the disruptions and risks associated
with fracking on my neighbors’ property, the notion that fracking is
generally safe or provides environmental benefits to others produces
cognitive dissonance. I would be much more comfortable if my
efforts opposing fracking benefited not only me, but also society as a
whole; therefore, I am motivated to conclude that the net social
benefits of fracking are negative.
Recent research within the fields of psychology, anthropology, and
neurobiology has gone well beyond the simple notion of
rationalization, revealing much more about when, why, and how
rationalizations occur. Under the banner of “behavioralism,” this
research has made significant inroads into legal scholarship and
economics;135 indeed, Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences award in 2002 for his work
with Amos Tversky identifying systematic human decision-making
heuristics and biases.136 For our purposes, several ideas drawn from
this research have contributed to our understanding of behavioral
phenomena that help explain not only the polarization of the fracking
debate, but also reasons why that polarization can interfere with
reasoned policymaking. Because shale gas production policy creates
winners and losers (no matter what the policy choice), the losers may
seek redress from the government—i.e., judges, regulators, or
legislators. As policymakers consider their options, they should
beware of the ways in which heuristics and biases can interfere with
developing a clear-eyed understanding of what we know, and that
135. For example, see the work of Jeff Rachlinski. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest
Jourden, The Cognitive Components of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 457
(2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 299; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew Wistrich, Judging
by Heuristic Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44
(2002). See also the work of Cass Sunstein with various co-authors, including
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (summarizing and expanding upon
earlier articles applying behavioralism to legal topics).
136. This work comprises a large number of scholarly papers on the psychology
of choice, many arising from experiments. For a good example of this work (and
one that subsumes more than one such experiment), see Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124
(1974).
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which we do not know, about fracking. Specifically, because
policymaking is subject to political pressures, policymakers must
beware of the tendency of policy combatants toward bias in
assimilating new information about fracking.
In a perfectly rational world, one might hypothesize that as we
learn more about the effects of fracking, rational, unbiased decision
makers on all sides of the fracking issue—whatever their value
differences—will converge upon a common understanding of the
environmental and health effects of shale gas production.137 In the
language of Bayesian138 decision-making, when confronted with new
information that is consistent with hypothesis H1, our estimate of the
probability that H1 is true ought to increase, or at least ought not to
decrease.139 By that logic, as we develop a fuller record of the effects
of fracking, remaining disagreements about policy ought to be based
more and more on value differences (such as disagreement over the
relative importance of climate effects, jobs, etc.) rather than on
disagreements over the factual predicates of a policy decision.
However, behavioral research suggests that that sort of convergence
around certain empirical truths will not happen; to the contrary, it is
likely that combatants in the fracking debate will instead harden their
beliefs as the factual record develops, in part by assimilating new
information about the effects of shale gas production in biased ways.
Confirmation bias refers to the notion that people are motivated to
defend and protect cherished beliefs, and so will assimilate and
interpret new information in ways that protect those beliefs. One
scholar has described this process as a kind of unconscious analog to
the process trial lawyers go through when building a case—a kind of
“unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence.”140 The
phenomenon has been recognized by the discipline of psychology
137. See e.g., DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James S. Fishkin & Peter
Laslett eds., 2003). This is part of the rationale for the notion of “deliberative
democracy,” an idea championed by political scientist James Fishkin. Id.
138. Bayesian reasoning involves the way we make decisions under uncertainty,
and how we might logically update beliefs about uncertain facts in the face of new
information.
139. For a detailed discussion of Bayesian probability theory, see Bayes’
Theorum, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayestheorem (last updated June 28, 2003).
140. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 175, 175 (1988).
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since at least 1924, and has since been documented through
experiments in countless forms.141 For example, experimental
subjects repeatedly recall evidence supporting their pre-existing
beliefs better than they recall contradictory evidence.142 Indeed, we
are motivated to confirm even unsupported hypotheses: experimental
subjects given a hypothesis in the absence of evidence require less
supportive evidence to confirm that hypothesis than contradictory
evidence to reject it.143 Not only that, subjects sometimes interpret
contradictory evidence as supportive of their beliefs;144 in one
experiment subjects who supported the death penalty concluded from
a scholarly article on the subject that it did also, while readers who
opposed the death penalty drew the opposite conclusion from the
very same article.145
Thus, proponents of fracking can be supremely confident that the
practice has never contaminated drinking water sources, despite the
EPA’s conclusions about contamination at Pavilion, Wyoming or
producers’ decisions to settle contamination lawsuits. At the same
time, opponents of fracking remain equally confident that it
inevitably leads to drinking water contamination, despite the various
academic studies indicating that contamination is likely very rare.146
Moreover, proponents and opponents alike cite the same anecdotes
141. See id. Nickerson calls confirmation bias so “sufficiently strong and
pervasive that one is led to wonder whether the bias, by itself, might account for a
significant fraction of the disputes, altercations, and misunderstandings that occur
among individuals, groups, and nations.” Id.
142. See generally D.N. Perkins, Richard Allen & James Hafner, Difficulties in
Everyday Reasoning, in THINKING: THE EXPANDING FRONTIER 177 (William
Maxwell ed., 1983); D.N. Perkins et al., Everyday Reasoning and the Roots of
Intelligence, in INFORMAL REASONING AND EDUCATION 83 (James F. Voss et al.
eds., 1991).
143. See Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of
Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased
Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297
(1987).
144. Gordon F. Pitz et al., Sequential Effects in the Revision of Subjective
Probabilities, 21 CANADIAN J. OF PSYCHOL. 381 (1967).
145. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2108 (1979).
146. See discussion of the scientific literature on water contamination, supra
notes 84–88, and accompanying text.
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(such as the EPA’s investigation of water contamination in Dimock,
Pennsylvania, or the Dunkard Creek incident in West Virginia) and
studies (such as the Duke study)147 in support of their groundwater
contamination claims. We see this same dynamic at work in the
debate over the climate and economic effects of shale gas production
as well.
Confirmation bias is about defending one’s beliefs: once we form a
belief, we assimilate new information in a biased fashion
thereafter.148 This gives rise to something called “the primacy effect,”
the idea that we give more weight to the information we receive first
about a particular issue than to information we receive later.149 This
is apparently true irrespective of the truth or falsity of the underlying
belief.150 Stated differently, first impressions are durable. If one’s
first exposure to information about fracking is favorable—say,
because one works for the industry or has a friend who does—one’s
initial beliefs about the relative benefits of shale gas production will
likely be very different from the initial beliefs formed by someone
whose first exposure to the issue was viewing Gasland, for example.
A closely related but conceptually distinct alternative explanation
for biased assimilation comes from anthropology. According to this
view, we disagree about the empirical dimensions of important policy
questions not because we lack balanced information about those
questions, but because our prior “cultural commitments” shape our
147. See supra note 87, and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Pitz et al., supra note 144; Nickerson, supra note 140, at 177

(“The evidence also supports the view that once one has taken a position on an
issue, one’s primary purpose becomes that of defending or justifying that
position.”).
149. See Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First
Impressions, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 286 (1983).
150. One study noted in pertinent part:
It is natural to associate the confirmation bias with the perseverance of false beliefs,
but in fact the operation of the bias may be independent of the truth or falsity of the
belief involved. Not only can it contribute to the perseverance of unfounded beliefs,
but it can help make beliefs for which there is legitimate evidence stronger than the
evidence warrants. Probably few beliefs of the type that matter to people are totally
unfounded in the sense that there is no legitimate evidence that can be marshaled
for them. On the other hand, the data regarding confirmation bias, in the aggregate,
suggest that many beliefs may be held with a strength or degree of certainty that
exceeds what the evidence justifies.
Nickerson, supra note 140, at 188.
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beliefs about those underlying empirical facts.151 In other words, we
are each psychologically committed to our own social identity, which
in turn is tied to our group memberships, our ideology, etc. Our
commitments to those identities “operate as a kind of heuristic” that
prevents the rational processing of information on public policy
matters.152 In particular, this dynamic distorts our perceptions of risk,
making us far more amenable to new information about risk that is
consistent with our cultural identity. We rely on experts, but we only
trust those experts who “share our values;” and we assess whether an
expert shares our values based, in part, on the content of the expert’s
opinion.153 This is a phenomenon that Dan Kahan and his colleagues
at the Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project call the “cultural
cognition of risk.”154
Kahan and others have demonstrated the biased assimilation of
expert information based upon political ideology155 across a number
of public policy issue contexts, including gun control,156 the death
penalty,157 the safety of nuclear power,158 and more. This cultural
cognition phenomenon is particularly pronounced where
151. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public
Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 148 (2006).
152. Id. at 149. Note that this phenomenon does not imply duplicity, but rather
the same kind of unconscious case-building described by Nickerson, albeit for a
slightly different reason. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., id. at 151. The authors’ measure of ideology is based upon the
“group-grid” typology developed by political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, which
classifies ideological preferences along two dimensions: the group dimension
(individualist versus communitarian), and the grid dimension (hierarchist versus
egalitarian). Wildavsky (and, by extension, Kahan & Braman) ascribe left-wing
ideology to egalitarian communitarians, and right-wing ideology to hierarchical
individualists. See also Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific
Consensus, 14 J. OF RISK RES. 147 (2010).
156. See DAN M. KAHAN ET AL., THE SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE
STUDY: MAKING SENSE OF—AND MAKING PROGRESS IN—THE AMERICAN
CULTURE WAR OF FACT 8 (2007).
157. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes:
Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19 (1994); see also
Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty—It’s
Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448 (1998).
158. See KAHAN ET AL., supra note 156, at 4–6.
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environmental risks are involved because the question of whether the
government ought to act to reduce risk invokes fundamental elements
of one’s political ideology and, therefore, one’s identity.159 Most
recently, Kahan et al. demonstrated that biased assimilation occurs
even when subjects are presented with evidence of a scientific
consensus about the empirical facts in question. In one study,
researchers presented subjects with evidence of a national scientific
consensus160 supporting two propositions: (i) that climate change is
real and driven by human activity, and (ii) that nuclear waste can be
safely disposed of in a geological repository. When asked to rate the
credibility of the experts supporting these propositions, political
conservatives rated the credibility of the climate change experts
much less highly than the nuclear waste disposal experts, while
political liberals reversed those rankings.161
Thus, combatants in the fracking debate assimilate new
information about the risks of shale gas production in ways that are
most consistent with their sense of their individual identities, and
they work to discredit the authors of studies reaching conclusions
contradicting their positions. Anti-fracking activists have challenged
two of the studies finding no connection between groundwater
contamination and fracking, one from Penn State University162 and
another from the University of Texas.163 In both cases, critics alleged
159. See Kahan et al., supra note 155, at 152 (“Egalitarians and
[communitarians] are thus naturally sensitive to environmental risk, the reduction
of which justifies regulating commercial activities that are productive of social
inequality and that legitimize unconstrained self-interest. Individualists predictably
dismiss claims of environmental risk as specious, in line with their commitment to
the autonomy of markets and other private orderings.”). See also MARY DOUGLAS
& AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF
TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982) (exploring this phenomenon).
160. See Kahan, et al., supra note 155, at 152. These propositions were selected
because the National Academy of Sciences had issued reports supporting both. Id.
161. Id. at 165.
162. ELIZABETH W. BOYER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF MARCELLUS GAS DRILLING
ON RURAL DRINKING WATER SUPPLIES, CTR. FOR RURAL PENN. (2011),
http://www.rural.palegislature.us/documents/reports/Marcellus_and_drinking_wate
r_2011_rev.pdf.
163. CHARLES P. GROAT & THOMAS W. GRIMSHAW, FACT-BASED REGULATION
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT, U. TEX. ENERGY
INST. (2012), available at http://www.slideshare.net/MarcellusDN/factbased-
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that the studies’ conclusions were driven by connections between the
university and industry.164 Similarly, industry critics have challenged
a Cornell University study—which found higher levels of natural gas
in groundwater near natural gas production wells—on similar
grounds, alleging that the study’s conclusions were influenced by one
of its funders.165
It may be that biased assimilation is facilitated by our brains’
tendency to invent taxonomies to organize information about the
world; once created, we assimilate new information in ways that fit
those taxonomies.166 Alternatively, Kahan et al. has labeled this
“narrative framing,” explaining in pertinent part:
[I]ndividuals tend to assimilate information by fitting it to
pre-existing narrative templates or schemes that invest the
information with meaning. The elements of these narrative
templates—the identity of the stock heroes and villains, the
nature of their dramatic struggles, and the moral stakes of

regulation-for-environmental-protection-in-shale-gas-development. The study was
later withdrawn by the University of Texas.
164. Critics have condemned the Penn State University study as industry-funded
and led by a pro-industry academic. See Jim Efstathiou Jr., Frackers Fund
University Research that Proves Their Case, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2012, 11:52
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-23/frackers-fund-universityresearch-that-proves-their-case.html. With regard to the University of Texas study,
an internal university review found that the principal investigator had failed to
disclose his membership on the board of directors of an oil and gas company;
however, the internal review ultimately determined that the conclusions contained
in the issue papers comprising the study (none of which were authored by the
principal investigator) were not undermined by the principal investigator’s industry
connection. Id.
165. See Mike Soraghan, Quiet Foundation Funds the ‘Anti-Fracking’ Fight,
E&E PUB. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/03/
12/1.
166. Nickerson calls this “reification.” See Nickerson, supra note 140, at 183
(“Taxonomies that are invented as conceptual conveniences often come to be seen
as representing the way the world is really structured. Given the existence of a
taxonomy, no matter how arbitrary, there is a tendency to view the world in terms
of the categories it provides.”).
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their engagement with one another—vary in identifiable
and recurring ways across cultural groups.167
It is easy to see how this kind of framing might influence our
assimilation of new information about shale gas production. There is
a long history of framing political conflict over energy policy as
“energy versus the environment,” “people versus profits,” and “fossil
fuels versus clean energy.” Often, these kinds of associations are not
conscious choices; to the contrary, they are a function of how the
human brain stores (and recalls) information.168
When proponents of shale gas production tout the environmental
benefits of clean, inexpensive natural gas, they are running headlong
into those framing effects. The environmental battles of the past often
pitted the forces of environmentalism against the “fossil fuels”
industry, creating associations in our minds between coal, oil and gas
that impede the efforts of fracking’s proponents to draw
environmental distinctions between those fuels. Thus, for example,
climate change activist Bill McKibben perceives no real distinction
between “hydrocarbons;” instead, McKibben simply advocates for a
move away from all of them, since “getting at them requires ripping
apart the earth . . . .”169 Similarly, fracking proponents may also be
fighting some people’s associations between oil and gas companies,
on the one hand, and pollution, on the other. When the brain stores
information from news stories about the Exxon Valdez accident and
the Deepwater Horizon spill, it may develop neural connections
between the parts of the brain that store information about oil and gas
companies and those storing information about pollution. Those
connections, in turn, influence how we process (credit or discredit)
subsequent information we encounter about, say, natural gas.

167. Kahan et al., supra note 155, at 170.
168. See, e.g., DEAN BUONOMANO, BRAIN BUGS: HOW THE BRAIN’S FLAWS

SHAPE OUR LIVES 141 (2011) (“[W]e are all too well prepared to learn to fear
through observation . . . . Because vicarious learning is in part unconscious, it
seems to be partially resistant to reason and ill-prepared to distinguish fact from
fiction.”).
169. Bill McKibben, Why Not Frack?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Mar. 8, 2012),
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/08/why-notfrack.
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Moreover, this effect is particularly powerful when fear is
involved, because the fear circuitry of the brain can override reason.
Neurobiologist Dean Buanomano calls this “amygdala politics,”170
and warns that “we should be most concerned about how
vulnerabilities in our fear circuits are exploited by others.”171 Indeed,
the brain’s fear circuitry (the amygdala) has greater influence on the
brain’s reasoning centers (the cortex) than the cortex has on the
amygdala, allowing emotion to override reason in decision-making
when emotion is invoked.172 Appeals to fear, then, can be effective
tools in the battle over public opinion. In particular, local NIMBY
(not in my backyard) opposition to fracking seems consistent with
amygdala politics. The probability that one’s drinking water well will
be contaminated by fracking nearby may be low, but the harm (if it
does occur) is great, invoking the brain’s fear centers. Furthermore,
even if the probability of contamination is low, the fear is real, and
NIMBY opposition may be entirely rational.
Of course, this research is merely providing scientific
underpinnings for ideas philosophers have long recognized.
Machiavelli advised princes on the use of fear for political ends 400
years ago, and we have already noted one American founder’s
familiarity with the power of rationalization and biased
assimilation.173 Unfortunately, we seem to be more aware of these
dynamics in others than in ourselves.174 I may understand that your
opposing beliefs about empirical facts are sincerely held, but I
attribute them to your bias while ascribing objectivity to my own

170. BUANOMANO supra note 168 at 138 (citing the work of Joe LeDoux.)
171. Id.
172. JOSEPH E. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS

UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 303 (1998).
173. NICCOLÒ MACCHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Phillip Smith ed. 1992).
174. The “fundamental attribution error” is the human tendency to attribute
causes of bad behavior to actors’ internal, dispositional factors rather than
situational pressures. In other words, we tend to explain our own actions as a
product of an internal narrative that almost always includes good intentions; but we
explain others’ actions without the benefit of their internal narratives, and so we are
quicker to include selfish or bad intentions in those explanations. See generally
MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011).
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beliefs.175 You will likely do the same for me. This problem is
particularly acute within groups, where we sometimes succumb to
“naïve realism,” or the human tendency to view in-group factual
beliefs as “objective” and out-group beliefs as subject to biases.176
Naïve realism is a modern relative of “groupthink,” which
psychologist Irving Janis has defined as “a mode of thinking that
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”177
More recently, Tim Kuran has documented what he calls “preference
falsification,” the tendency of individuals to tailor their choices to
what appears to be socially acceptable within a group.178 In any case,
175. Nickerson argues that confirmation bias is stronger and more pronounced in
heated arguments:

[C]an anyone doubt that whenever one finds oneself engaged in a
verbal dispute it becomes very strong indeed? In the heat of an
argument people are seldom motivated to consider objectively
whatever evidence can be brought to bear on the issue under
contention. One’s aim is to win and the way to do that is to make
the strongest possible case for one’s own position while
countering, discounting, or simply ignoring any evidence that
might be brought against it.
Nickerson, supra note 140, at 205.
176. Kahan et al., supra note 155, at 164.
177. IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 (1972). In other words, in order to be
“team players” and “go with the flow,” members of groups are prone to signing off
on group decisions that they would never have made individually. The space
shuttle Challenger disaster and the Kennedy Administration’s Bay of Pigs fiasco
have been cited as examples of the potentially disastrous consequences of
groupthink. When later interviewed individually, members of the Kennedy
administration all claimed that they had severe qualms about the ill-fated invasion
to overthrow Castro, but said that they thought they might be the only person in the
room not in agreement with the plan. Therefore, to enhance group solidarity, they
all chose to appear just as confident in the plan’s ultimate favorable outcome as the
others appeared to be. See also ROBYN M. DAWES, EVERYDAY IRRATIONALITY:
HOW PSEUDO- SCIENTISTS, LUNATICS, AND THE REST OF US SYSTEMATICALLY
FAIL TO THINK RATIONALLY 152 (2002).
178. See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 3 (1997) (describing “preference
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it seems that initial beliefs are strengthened (and insulated from
challenge) within homogeneous groups.179 In this way, both pro- and
anti-fracking groups exacerbate the biased assimilation of
information, further widening the gulf of perception between them.
Hence the growing polarization between combatants in the debate
over shale gas production, even as the scientific community builds a
more careful and circumspect view of the relative risks of fracking.180
CONCLUSION: COOL ANALYSIS AND FRACKING POLICY
So what, then, is a policymaker to do? Policymakers need to be
aware of the centrifugal forces at work in the shale gas policy debate,
forces that are exacerbated by combatants who are deeply entrenched
in their positions. Recently, Bill Gates, speaking about the climate
change debate, lamented that “extreme views get more attention than
nuanced views,” despite scientists best efforts to be clear and
impartial.181 Gates blamed “both liberals and conservatives” for
making it difficult for the general public to understand the
nuances.182 Regardless, policymakers should not expect alreadyhardened positions to soften, no matter how the evidentiary record
develops. Of course, shale gas policy decisions implicate important
environmental and economic values, and policymakers should not
pretend otherwise. However, ideally, policymakers will base their
decisions on a clear-eyed view of the facts. In the face of political
falsification” as “the act of misrepresenting one’s genuine wants under perceived
social pressures.”).
179. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 105–11 (2000).
180. Recently, the think tank Resources for the Future surveyed experts on the
risks of fracking. The experts identified twelve “consensus risks” associated with
fracking, ten of which are common to other forms of natural gas development. See
ALAN KRUPNICK, HAL GORDON & SHEILA OLMSTEAD, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE, PATHWAYS TO DIALOGUE: WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY ABOUT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 18–19 (2013), http://
www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-Rpt-PathwaystoDialogue_FullReport.pdf.
181. See e.g., Benny Peiser, Solar Activity Weakest In A Century, CLIMATE
CHANGE
DISPATCH
(Dec.
16,
2013),
http://
www.climatechangedispatch.com/11960-solar-activity-weakest-in-a-century.html.
Bill Gates made these observations in the course of reviewing a book on resource
scarcity issues.
182. Id.
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pressure, it is difficult to cut through the moral outrage and focus on
cool analysis. However, there are ways to structure policy
deliberations so as to minimize the effect of centrifugal forces on
policy decisions.
Policymakers will make better decisions about fracking and shale
gas production if they rely on the scientific literature, taking the
claims promulgated by industry and anti-fracking activists with a
grain of salt. Even though scientists and academics are not immune to
the biases described in the previous section,183 they are still subject to
methodological norms that privilege the null hypothesis, impose a
duty of circumspection on their conclusions, and subject their
conclusions to peer review and challenge. All of these forces tend to
make the growing corpus of scientific literature on fracking and shale
gas production far more important to the goal of good policymaking
than the anecdotes, stories, and hyperbolic claims of combatants in
the policy debate. More specifically, policymakers can use the
scientific literature in the following ways.
First, policymakers must recognize that the scientific debate is
focused on much narrower issues than the policy debate. The
combatants in the policy debate are driving toward predetermined
conclusions—i.e., “fracking is good” or “fracking is bad.”
Consequently, the combatants minimize or deny even obvious truths,
and reflexively challenge contributions to the scientific literature,
which contradict their points of view. Scientists, by contrast, do not
dispute the central truths about shale gas production outlined above
in Part I.A. They acknowledge that shale gas production imposes real
costs on local communities—such as noise, truck traffic,
“boomtown” effects, and other indicia of industrialization during the
period when a well is being “fracked.” At the same time, scientists
recognize that shale gas production brings real local economic
benefits—including jobs and local government revenues during the
production period. The scientific debate is thus focused on specific
questions, such as the magnitude of the risks to groundwater posed
by shale gas production, or the amount of methane that escapes from
natural gas wells and production equipment. Combatants in the
183. See generally Nickerson, supra note 140, at 189 (“Experts are not immune
from the illusion of validity . . . [but nevertheless] appear to do better when there is
a reliable basis for statistical prediction . . . .”).
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policy debate sometimes try to misrepresent the results of such
scholarly studies, presenting their implications as much broader than
they actually are.
For example, as noted above in Part I, the authors of the Duke
University study found no evidence that groundwater quality near
natural gas production wells in the Marcellus Shale had been
impaired by natural gas operations; but they did find evidence that
deep, thermogenic methane and brines had found their way into
shallow groundwater sometime prior to the commencement of their
study.184 Industry advocates seized upon the study’s first finding to
support their claim that fracking does not threaten groundwater,
while anti-fracking advocates focused on the latter finding, which
they claimed indicated the presence of a tangible risk to
groundwater.185 Indeed, viewed as a whole, the scholarly literature on
groundwater contamination from shale gas production activities
points toward a truth somewhere in the middle—namely, that the risk
of groundwater contamination is greater than zero, but very small.
Several studies—including the Duke study and the most recent
USGS study186—sampling groundwater near hundreds of natural gas
production wells before and after production activities in several
different regions have failed to detect evidence of contamination by
fracking. By the same token, it is equally clear that contamination is
possible due to poor handling of fluids at the surface or failure to
properly construct or seal natural gas wells. These kinds of failures
may be the cause of the Wyoming and Pennsylvania contamination
incidents described above in Part I. In any event, natural gas
production companies have fracked many tens of thousands of wells
in the last five years, and assuming normal rates of human error, it
would defy logic to suggest that the risk of groundwater
contamination associated with fracking is zero.
Second, in order to try to insulate policy decisions from the
centrifugal forces present in the political debate, elected politicians
should delegate to unelected bureaucrats the responsibility of
developing the factual record underlying policy decisions.
184. See Osborn et al., supra note 87, at 8174–75; supra text accompanying
notes 87–88.
185. For a good discussion of the misuse of science in the fracking debate, see
Begos, supra note 22.
186. See Kresse et al., supra note 91.
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Combatants in the fracking policy debate will place tremendous
pressure on elected officials. Industry has the economic resources to
influence elected politicians through campaign contributions and
issue campaigns; anti-fracking activists can use celebrity star power
and moral outrage to bring indirect electoral pressure on elected
politicians. For reasons outlined in Part II of this essay, any decisionmaker subject to this kind of pressure is prone to biased assimilation
of the data. By insulating decision-makers from that sort of direct
pressure, policymakers will develop a more accurate factual
foundation for their decisions. For example, as of this writing, the
states of New York, Maryland, and New Jersey are each involved in
a protracted decision process in which elected leaders have imposed
moratoria on shale gas development pending completion of impact
studies led by panels of unelected experts. This approach may seem
painful and slow, but there may be a method to the madness: it may
constitute a way for elected politicians to create a more accurate and
factual record on which to base their decisions.
Third, policymakers should avoid staking out positions prior to
making formal policy decisions. Policymakers might stake out a
position “too early” by committing to specific positions in meetings
with combatants in the fracking policy debate, or by taking positions
in interviews or speeches. The confirmation bias phenomenon tells us
that once taken, we resist moving off of those initial positions
irrespective of how the factual record develops subsequently. Our
understanding of the cultural cognition of risk tells us that our view
of the facts is conditioned by our sense of identity, and the groups to
which we belong. By keeping constituent groups at arm’s length on
this issue before rendering a policy decision, policymakers can try to
mitigate the effects of these biases. Thus, for example, by remaining
noncommittal about the ultimate decision, Governor Cuomo of New
York and Governor Christie of New Jersey not only preserve their
room for political maneuver, but may also help themselves make a
more reasoned decision when the choice is due.
While the scientific community continues to study the impacts of
hydraulic fracturing, and to learn more about them, it seems at least
unlikely that the environmental and health costs associated with
reliance on natural gas approach the comparable costs of our reliance
on coal. We cannot say this with certainty, but based upon what we
know today, the costs of the latter dwarf those of the former.
Furthermore, most of those who bear the health and other costs
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associated with our reliance on coal are unrepresented in the shale
gas policymaking process. Most of the people who die prematurely
from exposure to airborne particles and other byproducts of coal
combustion cannot identify their killer, and so never take part in
debates over the relative merits of coal versus gas.187 By contrast,
most of those who bear the costs associated with shale gas production
are aware of the costs that shale gas production will impose on them.
Consequently, they are motivated to participate in that process, and to
oppose fracking in their communities. Rational risk regulation, then,
would suggest that politicians ought to be aware of the
underrepresentation of coal’s victims in the policy process.
None of which is to imply that states and local communities ought
not to be able to make decisions regarding the regulation of fracking
and shale gas production. To the contrary, as I have argued
elsewhere,188 they are best suited to make those decisions, because
most of the impacts of fracking—both positive and negative—are felt
locally. Nevertheless, policymakers ought not make those decisions
myopically, but rather with a full understanding of all of the
consequences (costs and opportunity costs) of each alternative.
Indeed, one cannot make responsible decisions about shale gas
production and fracking in any other way. It will take some doing,
but it is up to decision-makers to rise above decision biases, or to
help the public to do so. This process may take time, just as it has
with climate change policy. Thomas Jefferson was philosophical
about these kinds of delays and detours when he noted that “in every
free [and] deliberating society there must, from the nature of man, be
opposite parties [and] violent dissensions [and] discords,” but that
after “[a] little patience . . . . the reign of witches [shall] pass over,
187. Some adversely impacted by coal are aware of these costs, but tolerate them
anyway. Support for the coal industry is high in the Appalachian states, which bear
a good portion of the costs of exposure to airborne coal contaminants. See Epstein
et al., supra note 124, at 84. This suggests an interesting environmental justice
question: If those local opposition to shale gas production is greater than local
opposition to coal production, is that due to socioeconomic disparities between coal
and shale gas communities? If so, what environmental justice considerations does
that raise for policymakers’ consideration? Those questions are beyond the scope
of this essay.
188. See generally David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the
Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013).
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their spells dissolve, and the people [will recover] their true
sight . . . .”189

189. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (June 4, 1798), available at
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-john-taylor-2.

